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A CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL





The announcement of Internet-based and other new retail electronic
payments mechanisms,' one of the biggest changes in banking in the re-
cent past, may threaten traditional notions of what constitutes "the business
*Adjunct Associate Professor of Law at Indiana University-Bloomington. Fred
Gate, Jeffery Atik, Robert Kaiman, and Elinor Harris Solomon provided helpful com-
ments and criticisms. I am grateful for the research assistance of former and current
students, Lori Yarbor, Christopher Goff, and Michael Vreeland. Despite so much help,
all responsibility for errors that may appear is mine. Copyright Sarah Jane Hughes
1995, all rights reserved.
"'Retail electronic payment systems" offer equivalents of cash or certain retail
banking transactions-particularly checks, drafts, and other credit or debit transfers-
primarily in support of purchase transactions. See David Laster & John Wenninger,
Policy Issues Raised by Electronic Money, paper prepared for the Columbia Institute
for Tele-Information's Conference on Digital Cash and Electronic Money, 1-2 (April
21, 1995) (copy available on file with the author) (describing the potential for elec-
tronic payments to displace "physical currency, checks, and credit card transactions").
These systems are similar to "financial electronic data interchange" services in that
they combine electronic transfers of funds and of remittance data. See Scott Knudson
et al., Business-to-Business Payments and the Role of Financial Electronic Data Inter-
change, 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 269 (April, 1994) (illustrating how electronic data inter-
change in standard formats has allowed business trading partners to replace labor inten-
sive activities such as issuing, mailing, and collecting checks through the banking system
with automated initiation, transmission and processing of payment instructions).
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of banking."' 2 At the very least, new electronic payments mechanisms
challenge traditional "banking" activities such as holding deposits, clear-
ing checks, conducting foreign exchange, and executing wholesale wire
transfers over bank-based funds transfer networks. Indeed, these new
payments options appear poised to eliminate many "banking" functions
from the province of banks and other financial intermediaries with which
bank customers customarily deal.
Viewed most favorably, emerging retail electronic payments mechanisms
offer enormous opportunities for efficient financial services and commerce.
Viewed least favorably, they create opportunities for serious mischief such
as penetrations of major banks' computer systems, 3 fraudulent investment
offers, 4 speedy and anonymous means of laundering drug profits,5 on-line
gambling, 6 and threats to the exercise of national monetary policy.7 In addi-
212 U.S.C. S 24(Seventh) (1994) (The National Bank Act of 1863, as amended);
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. BANKS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2, OTA-BP-TCT-100 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 OTA
PAPER].
3Kelley Holland, Bank Fraud, the Old-Fasioned Way, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1995, at 96(describing how youth in St. Petersburg, Russia allegedly penetrated and siphoned
off $400,000 from Citibank's cash management accounts and attempted to steal more
than $10 million more); Policing Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 23, 1995,
at 55-56 (discussing "salami slicing," a pattern of electronic transfer-thefts from ac-
counts in amounts so small that most account-holders would not recognize bank state-
ment contained balance errors).
4So far, the Securities and Exchange Commission has sued Telephone Informa-
tion Systems and affiliates on the grounds that their "cyberspace come-ons for an
'American Indian Lottery' were unregistered securities amounting to little more than
high-tech pyramid schemes." Susan Antilla, Market Place: Another First for Cyberspace! An
S.E.C. Suit for Investor Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at D10; see also Susan Antilla,
Has Cyberspace Got a Deal for You!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, § 3 (Money &
Business/Financial Desk), at 5 (describing electronic commerce offers, for example,
for investment in a petroleum pipeline in Guatemala and in Huntway, a supplier for
the West Coast of asphalt and producer of diesel fuel needed to run operations in
"Yugoslavia").
5Benjamin Wittes, The Dark Side of DIGITAL CASH, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995,
at 1. See also Internet Aids Money Laundering Fraud Expert, The Reuters Business Report,
June 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (explaining that Internet
and computer technology turned money laundering into a $300 billion worldwide
activity).
6see William M. Bulkeley, New On-Line Casinos May Thwart US. Laws, WALL ST. J.,
May 10, 1995, at B1 (describing two companies that are setting up "on line" betting
emporiums in Caribbean countries to skirt U.S. laws).
7See JOEL KURTZMAN, THE DEATH OF MONEY: HOW THE ELECTRONIC ECONOMY
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tion, the new mechanisms operate just outside the scope of many national
laws that apply to current "banking" transactions, including those that
promote safety and soundness and deposit protection. As a result, we must
consider the extent to which these changes will require the creation of new
laws-both domestic and international.8
Legal standards for new electronic payments mechanisms should balance
fair dealing and the need for certainty in the conduct of financial and related
commercial transactions with the encouragement of innovation. Public ac-
ceptance of these payments mechanisms may depend on the chosen legal
standards. 9
Legal standards for these payments systems must focus on three areas
of concern. First, to the extent possible, legal standards must avoid the costs
that the current patchwork of national laws imposes on cross-border partici-
pants.10 Next, the legal standards must create a level playing field between
HAS DESTABILIZED THE WORLD'S MARKETS AND CREATED FINANCIAL CHAOS 87-88,
92 (1993) (describing the inability of economists to measure the supply of money in
the world and the creation of new financial instruments that has further reduced the
ability of central banks to control the money supply). See also Wittes, supra note 5 (noting
that the London Stock Exchange warned of growing danger for future regulation of
financial markets from the Internet's worldwide web of computer networks).
8Research for this article identified the following nine areas for which these pay-
ment mechanisms will require new legal norms: (1) safety and soundness, (2) protec-
tion of participants whether they are commercial or consumer participants, (3) deter-
rence and prosecution of criminal conduct-particularly in terms of penetration and
corruption of the payments mechanisms by criminal elements with a resulting loss
of public acceptance of the affected payment systems, (4) monetary policy, (5) taxation
(both tax avoidance and difficulties in fixing the situs of the taxable event), (6) anti-
trust, (7) privacy protection, (8) settlement rules and other rules pertaining to manage-
ment of credit risks, and (9) pricing. Of course, more may arise-leaving much work
for scholars and regulators alike.
9See, e.g., Kawika Daguio, The History of Banks, the U.S. Government & Payment
System Improvements: The past's implications for future payment systems including
digital cash, the Columbia Graduate School of Business Conference on Electronic Com-
merce, 7 (April 20, 1995) (copy available on file with the author) ("Payment instruments
should be convenient, cost-effective, safe and confidential to assure wide usage....
Cooperative efforts between banks as an industry and between banks and the govern-
ment have made current payment instruments successful [sic] widely used, and can
make future payment mechanisms similarly successful.").
10These involve bank regulation, telecommunications, data privacy and records
retention, consumer-investor protection, and "bank secrecy" and anti-money launder-
ing as they affect payments mechanisms. See, e.g., Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money
Laundering: An International ChaUlenge, 3 TUL. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 161, 181-82, nn.
96-102 (describing the different money laundering statutes in several countries).
1996]
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heavily regulated banks and emerging, non-regulated non-bank competitors.
Finally, these standards should facilitate cross-border transactions in recogni-
tion of the desirability of international legal standards for globally accessible
payments mechanisms.
This article proposes baseline participant protections for these emerg-
ing payments mechanisms. It urges adoption of an international standard
because of the numerous cross-border transactions that will occur and the
nature of the new payments mechanisms. The principal objective of this
Article is to stimulate discussion of norms for these payments systems in
the legal, banking, and electronic commerce communities.
Part II of this article compares the fundamentals and the legal framework
of these emerging payments mechanisms with those of current payment
systems." Part III examines various aspects of the emerging systems that
require standards and proposes standards based on models from existing
payments systems.12 The proposed legal standards for new retail electronic
payments systems are based on legal standards that regulate existing elec-
tronic payments mechanisms such as wholesale wire transfers13 and elec-
tronic funds transfers.1 4 The proposed standards also are based in part on
standards governing paper-based payments systems, the law of sales, and
"See infra notes 20-127 and accompanying text.
12See infra notes 128-234 and accompanying text.
3Wholesale wire transfers in the United States are subject to Article 4A of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), which the majority of states adopted and which
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System adopted for its Fedwire transfer
system. See generally U.C.C. 5 4A (1995) (regulating funds transfers). In addition, in
1992, the United Nations completed work on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Credit Transfers. G.A. Res. 47/34, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17,
at 48-60, U.N. Doc. A/47/17) (1993) [hereinafter Credit Transfers Model Law]. For
an excellent analysis comparing the model law with Article 4A of the U.C.C., see Carl
Felsenfeld, The Compatibility of the Uncitral Model Law on International Credit Transfers with
Article 4A of the UC.C., 60 FoRDHAM L. REV. 53 (1992). As of early 1994, no nation
had adopted the Model Law as local law. Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code, PEB Credit Transfirs Commentary No. 13: The Place of Artice 4A in a Wrld
of Ectronic Funds Transfirs (Feb. 1994), in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES (West 1994)
[hereinafter PE.B No. 13].
14Electronic funds transfers, the retail banking relatives of wholesale wire transfers,
in the United States are subject to the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act 15 § U.S.C.
16 9 3-1693r (1994).
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the purposes underlying the proposed New Uniform Payments Code as
embodied in its 1982 "Introductory Memorandum by the Reporters.' 15
Part IV describes why we should undertake to provide standards for
specific payments systems at this time.16 Part V argues that we should begin
with international standards for participant protections because of worldwide
access to these payment mechanisms.1 7
Part VI briefly explains why a private or self-regulated set of rules would
be preferable to individual government or international regulation. It sug-
gests that the development of the standards be the task of a private inter-
national association or clearing house, such as SWIFT,8 or a payment-
system-specific sub-group of existing Internet working groups, such as The
Internet Society.'9
II. EXISTING AND NEW ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEMS
A. Existing Electronic Payments Mechanisms
Electronic payments and electronic financial transactions are not new.
The world's major funds transfer systems 20 move between $1 and $3 trillion
15Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, New Uniform
Payments Code-P.E.B. Draft No. 2: Introductory Memorandum by the Reporters
(Philadelphia, 1982) [hereinafter New Uniform Payments Code Report] (copy available
on file with author).
16See infra notes 235-248 and accompanying text.
17See infra notes 249-258 and accompanying text.
"'SWIFT" is the acronym for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications, which is based in Belgium, and which began operations in 1977.
As a third-party private network, SWIFT provides a communications network for a
large number of international funds transfers. P. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL BANK-
ING 95 (4th ed. 1983). For additional information on SWIFT's operations, see Hal
S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Unform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1664, 1673-74 & n. 50-54 (1983).
'
9The Internet Society is one of several working groups supervising the develop-
ment of the Internet in terms of commerce and technology. See Internet Society to Hold
Annual Conference in Prague, PR Newswire, May 9, 1994, availabe in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CurNWS File (noting that annual conference is the "only global forum" dealing with
worldwide Internet developments and technologies).
20' 'Funds transfers" refer primarily to credit transfers between banks or reflected
on accounts held by banks and processed through long-established payments systems
such as Fedwire, CHIPS, SWIFT, and CHAPS. Fedwire is the funds transfer system
1996]
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daily2 1 The automated clearing houses ("ACH") in the United States
originated more than 2.5 billion ACH items in 1994.22 As of 1993, one
expert identified twenty-one "major electronic networks around the world
designed to move money."'23
In addition, the world's major securities and commodities markets
have round-the-clock, on- and off-exchange electronic trading through
various Reuters' services such as Global Futures Exchange ("Globex"), 24
operated by the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks since 1918. U.S. CONGRESS, OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL OF
ELECTRONIC MONEY LAUNDERING 13, OTA-ITC-630 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 OTA
PAPER].
CHIPS is the acronym for the Clearing House Interbank Payments System, which
is a funds transfer system operated by the New York Clearing House Association since
1970. Id. at xii, 21-23. CHAPS is the acronym for the United Kingdom Clearing
House Automated Payments System, which is a large-value transfer system operated
by the clearing banks in the United Kingdom since 1984. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETrLEMENTS, PAYMENTS SYSTEMS IN ELEVEN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 57 (1985)
[hereinafter DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' PAYMENTS SYSTEMS].
Some of the systems deliver messages that complete the transfer of funds to the
beneficiary. Others, like SWIFT, only deliver instructions to pay the beneficiary and
require a separate financial transaction (frequently on CHIPS) to complete the transfer
of funds. Other funds transfer systems are in operation in a variety of developed coun-
tries. Id.
211n 1994, an average of more than 283,000 transfers were executed over Fedwire
daily with an average daily dollar value of $812 billion. 1995 OTA PAPER, supra note
20, at 20. CHIPS' daily volume is approximately 200,000 transfers with a value of
$1.2 trillion. See Steven Marjanovic, N. Y Clearing House Moving to Curb Risk in Settlements,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 3, 1995, at 17. CHIPS' largest volume of more than $1.95 trillion
was reached on January 17, 1995. 1995 OTA PAPER, supra note 20, at 28-31.
2 2 The Future: Electronic Checks?, CORP. EFT REP., Apr. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, NWLTRS File. Private ACH operators-those not using the clearing
house services offered by the Federal Reserve Board-originated 580 million ACH
items in 1994 or about 23% of the total. Id.
23 KuRTZMAN, supra note 7, at 183. Mr. Kurtzman noted that none of these pay-
ments systems were more secure with Fedwire, which suffered many breakdowns in
the period from the middle 1980's through 1990. KURTZMAN, supra note 7, at 183.
24See KURTZMAN, supra note 7, at 28 (describing several round-the-clock trading
systems). Globex is operated by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Reuters Holding
PLC. Reuters also operates Dealing 2000 and Instinet.
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and through services such as Aurora.2 5 Banks, securities firms, and their cus-
tomers also use telexes as means of giving payment or trading instructions.2 6
Existing wholesale and retail electronic payments mechanisms are within
the provinces of exclusive bank clubs, or of other corporate financial ser-
vice providers.2 I Existing electronic payments mechanisms share five key
attributes. First, participants generally conduct these transactions using
private, specially-designed, or limited-access networks.2 8 Second, participants
commonly base their transactions on pre-established accounts.2 9 Third, the
transacting parties are either well-known to each other, such as different
subsidiaries of a large organization, or deal together only through well-known
intermediaries, such as the world's largest commercial banks, long-
established securities exchanges, or funds transfers systems.3 0 Fourth, par-
25KURTZMAN, supra note 7, at 28. The Chicago Board of Trade operates Aurora.
KURTZMAN, supra note 7, at 28.
26&e Scott, supra note 18, at 1668-69, 1674 (describing wire transfers that may
be completed, among other ways, by telex); DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' PAYMENTS SYS-
TEMS, supra note 20, at 19, 57 (noting the use of telexes for interbank credit transfers
and other settlement obligations in Belgium and Japan, based on reports by central
bankers at year's end, 1983). For additional information on telex methodology, see
BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 1.1.3, (2d ed. 1991).
27Such as Fedwire, CHIPS, SWIFT, VISA International, MasterCard Interna-
tional, and American Express. In addition, auxiliary electronic payments systems, such
as those provided by Western Union "Moneygrams" and First Data Corp. electronic
transfers, offer corporations and consumers wholesale and retail payments services that
operate in more than 100 different currencies and settle in roughly 25 currencies on
a daily basis. Both Western Union and First Data are subsidiaries of American Ex-
press. Interview with Patrice Motz, Counsel, First Data Corporation, in New York,
N.Y. (Sept. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Motz Interview].
28See 1992 OTA PAPER, supra note 2, at 7-14 (describing various types of networks
available and explaining that in the 1980's and early 1990's major banks and other
service providers shifted between private (internal only, shared, or value-added) and
public networks to obtain telecommunications services necessary to support their elec-
tronic financial transactions).
29See Scott, supra note 18, at 1668, 1679-80 (describing wire transfers based on
preestablished accounts). Moneygram and First Data transfers do not operate on the
basis of accounts. Motz Interview, supra note 27.
3 0
"Funds-transfer system" means a wire transfer network, automated clearing
house, or other communication system of a clearing house or other association of banks
through which a payment order by a bank may be transmitted to the bank to which
the order is addressed. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5).
1996]
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ticipants follow specialized message formats"1 and individualized security
precautions as need and technology permit.3 2 Finally, participants conduct
these transactions in accordance with payments systems rules that govern
aspects of these transactions.3 3
Existing electronic payments systems enjoy a reputation for speed,
security, and reliability.3 4 This reputation contributed in part to the rapid
31SWIFT traditionally used the most comprehensive standard formats for its trans-
fer messages, which aided processing and transmission of instructions to the banks
required to transfer funds. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 95; 1992 OTA PAPER,
supra note 2, at 10-11.
In 1992, CHIPS expanded its funds transfer communications "fields" to match
SWIFT's and to carry more information about participants in specific funds transfers.
American Bankers Association, Comment to the U.S. Department of the Treasury 5
(Jan. 15, 1991) (commenting on Proposed Amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act Reg-
ulations Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers by Banks and Transmittals
of Funds by Other Financial Institutions, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (1990) (proposing amend-
ments to 31 C.F.R. 5 103.33, codified at 31 C.F.R. 103.33(o) (copy of comment avail-
able on file with author and available from Treasury). Fedwire currently requires min-
imal information-the amount transferred, the numbers of the accounts being debited
and credited (which identifies the sending and receiving banks), the number of the
beneficiary's account or other identifier, which identifies the beneficiary's bank. The
Federal Reserve Board announced Fedwire's expansion in January, 1995. Federal
Reserve Board, Notice of Service Enhancement, 60 Fed. Reg. 111 (1995) (to be imple-
mented fully by year-end 1997).
3 2U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note. The prefatory note explains:
To ensure that no unauthorized person is transmitting messages to the bank,
the normal practice is to establish security procedures that usually involve
the use of codes or identifying numbers or words. If the bank accepts a pay-
ment order that purports to be that of its customer after verifying its authen-
ticity by complying with a security procedure agreed to by the customer and
the bank, the customer is bound to pay the order even if it was not authorized.
But there is an important limitation on this rule. The bank is entitled to pay-
ment in the case of an unauthorized order only if the courts find that the
security procedure was a commercially reasonable method of providing secu-
rity against unauthorized payment orders.
See U.C.C. § 4A-201 (1995) (security procedure); U.C.C. 5 4A-202(c) (1995) (listing
factors determining "commercial reasonableness of a security procedure").
3See U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (1995) (stating that Fedwire transactions are governed
by Federal Reserve RegulationJ and CHIPS transfers are governed by CHIPS rules);
Scott, supra note 18, at 1669-74 (describing the rules governing Fedwire, Bankwire,
CHIPS, and SWIFT).
34 C. Dianne Martin & Fred Weingarten, The Less-Cash/Less-Check Society: Banking
in the Information Age, in ELINOR HARRIS SOLOMON, ELECTRONIC MONEY FLOWS: THE
MOLDING OF A NEW FINANCIAL ORDER 187, 191-92 (1991) (citing Jerome Svigals,
EFT Technology Evolution: The Next 10 Years, I EFr TODAY, Aug./Sept. 1988, at 9-11).
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growth in volume that they have experienced in recent years.3 5 Despite their
good reputation, these systems have faced numerous challenges. First, for
many years, wholesale funds transfer systems operated without benefit of
domestic or international laws3 6 until the adoption of Article 4A.17 Second,
originators of funds transfers and their banks either had limited contracts
to govern these transfers, or no contract at all.38 Third, funds transfer systems
suffered break-downs and electrical failures that rendered them inoperable
for hours at a time.3 9 Fourth, they are vulnerable to hackers who pierce
"According to 1980 figures, electronic funds transfers accounted for the movement
each year of $117 trillion. Scott, supra note 18, at 1664 & n. 1. Fedwire's daily transfers
of $1 to $2 trillion daily are more than twice the total value in 1983. Compare Laster
& Wenninger, supra note 1, at 1, with Martin & Weingarten, supra note 34, at 191-192.
36See Scott, supra note 18, at 1678 & n.72 (noting that prior to adoption of U.C.C.
Article 4A, disputes over bank wire transfers were "largely resolved by a gentleman's
agreement" among members of a "small club" of domestic and international bankers
involved in wire transactions that "broke down" after the number of banks offering
wire transfers grew).
In 1991, the Federal Reserve Board amended the RegulationJ provisions govern-
ing Fedwire to adopt Article 4A for all Fedwire transactions. 12 C.F.R. § 210 app.
B (1993).
In the United States and Australia, funds transfers are subject to specialized regula-
tions to preserve records of transfers as part of on-going efforts to deter or detect money
laundering. 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1995) (enhanced recordkeeping requirements for funds
transfers and funds transmittals promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and Department of the Treasury). Australia's AUSTRAC (the Austral-
ian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre), the Australian Tax Office, and other
Australian law enforcement agencies gather and analyze data on wire transfers for
the purpose of detecting money laundering activities. 1995 OTA REPORT, supra note
20, at 48.
37Article 4A of the U.C.C. was the first regulation of "funds transfers" other than
the rules of Fedwire, CHIPS, or SWIFT or the contracts of individual members of
the funds transfer systems or between bank and customer wishing to originate funds
transfers. See U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (1995) (stating that no comprehensive body
of law defining the rights and obligations that arise from wire transfers exists). Ap-
proved for state adoption in 1990, 49 states have adopted Article 4A.
"See U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (explaining that resolution of many issues not covered
by funds transfer system rules depend on parties' contracts or on analogy to law appli-
cable to other payment systems). Accord Scott, supra note 18, at 1664 ("due to a lack
of coverage and the limited use . .. ").
39See KURTZMAN, supra note 7, at 182-83 (detailing multiple breakdowns in Fed-
wire from the middle 1980's through 1990 and noting the Federal Reserve System's
intention to overcome these problems); Samantha Laurie, Computers in Finance 8; The
Burning Issue of Supervision-SWIFT Faces Problems, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 12, 1991), at art.
VIII, survey (explaining that early reliability problems of SWIFT system interfered
with European domestic clearing and end-of-day settlement).
19961
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their security systems.4 0 Finally, in recent years money launderers and tax
evaders have used these systems to obscure the beneficial ownership of funds
by transferring funds through multiple accounts inside and outside the
United States.4 1
B. Emerging Retail Electronic Payments Mechanisms
Since late 1994, banks and non-bank service providers have introduced
a number of retail electronic payments options, including several forms
of "digital cash." Among these new payment options are offerings by First
Virtual Holdings, Inc. ("First Virtual"), and DigiCash BV ("DigiCash").
First Virtual offers to prospective purchasers from Internet vendors a
trusted third-party, escrow-like security for their credit card numbers. The
customer uses the First Virtual account number instead of her credit card
account number in the on-line transaction and First Virtual charges the
customer's credit card account for the amount authorized.4 2 First Virtual's
service thus protects the credit card number from misappropriation by com-
puter hackers and from misuse by vendors.
DigiCash offers "electronic coins" to potential Internet purchasers;
purchasers buy coins from DigiCash and pay for them by downloading
value from their bank accounts to "electronic wallets" in their computers.4 3
40SeeJohn Markoff, Software Secunrty Flaw Puts Shoppers on Internet at Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1995, at Al (describing how two computer graduate students broke Netscape
security code revealing easily broken security for credit card numbers); Jared Sandberg,
Netscape Software for Cruising Internet Is Found to Have Another Security Flaw, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 25, 1995, at B8 (detailing three security flaws in Netscape software and others
in Unix software programs that also may affect confidential credit card or other per-
sonal data in Internet computers); William M. Carley & Timothy L. O'Brien, Cyber
Caper-How Citicorp System Was Raided and Funds Moved Around World, WALL ST. J., Sept.
12, 1995, at I (discussing the international breach of Citicorp's electronic cash-
management system).
41For example, the major funds transfers systems-and wholesale wire transfers
themselves-had become the dominant means of laundering drug profits by the late
1980's. American Bankers Association Money Laundering Task Force Report: Toward a New Na-
tiond Drug Policy-The Banking Industry Strategy, 135 CONG. REc. S5555-56 (daily ed. May
18, 1989).
*2Km A. Strassel, Dutch Software Concern Experiments with Electronic 'rash" in Cyberspace,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1995, at B6D.
43 d.
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DigiCash's system also protects the purchaser's sensitive financial infor-
mation from Internet thieves and offers more anonymity to purchasers con-
cerned about data privacy.
In addition, on August 23, 1995, a consortium of banks and service
providers including Citibank announced that they would begin to offer "elec-
tronic checking." 44 Proposed electronic checks would function mostly like
paper-based checks but would be faster and more secure in terms of
delivery.
4 5
These new payment mechanisms arose because of commercial oppor-
tunities created by wide access to the Internet."6 Commercial opportunities
range from consumer and commercial purchases of goods, software, or in-
formation, to investments, foreign exchange, and cash movement.47 The
entrepreneurial nature of the Internet marketplace created the need for
speedy, reliable, and secure4 8 payment systems.
44Saul Hansell, Checks Delivered Via E-Mail Are Planned, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995,
at D2; Steven Marjanovic &Jeffrey Kutler, Chemical, Boston Bank to Show Internet 'Check"
in Two Months, AM. BANKER, Aug. 25, 1995, at 1.
"See Marjanovic & Kutler, supra note 44, at 15 (discussing speed and security).
46Johanna Powell, Hiding Technology's Power: It won't be as visible, but it will be far more
sophisticated and helpful, FIN. POST, Apr. 29, 1995, availabe in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CurNWS File (noting that an Internet study found that growth in terms of numbers
of computers increased 132 % over twelve months ending in April, 1995, while a U.S.
study predicted that 8% of all transactions will be carried out over the Internet by
the year 2000).
47The goods and services range from bulk coffee to marine equipment offered
by some of the 60 on-line businesses active in Vermont-based Cybermalls, and other
so-called "distance stuff," such as books, software, outdoor gear, packaged foods and
collectibles, that people can buy without needing to touch them or try them on." Janice
Castro, Just Click to Buy-Madison Avenue Meets the On-Line Hord-and Neither Will Be the
Same Again," TIME, Spring 1995, at 74.
4 See John Gapper, The High Tech Art of Armchair Banking, FIN. TIMES, June 10-11,
1995, at 7 (efforts to create secure method for credit card payments over Internet spon-
sored jointly by VISA and Microsoft; Barclays Bank (U.K.) launched electronic mall
using encryption technology for credit card payments); Jared Sandberg, Some Banks
Bet the Internet Will Be the Medium, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1995, at B 1, B7 (quoting Susan
Weeks, vice president of public affairs at Citibank, explaining that Citibank would
not offer Internet banking "until we believe it's totally secure" and would continue
plans to offer services through its private electronic baking network).
Concerns over security were raised anew with two disclosures in September, 1995.
First, Citibank revealed that its cash management systems had been the victim of thefts
of $400,000 and the attempts to steal more than $10 million by means of wire transfers
initiated by a computer hacker located in the Russian Federation. John Mason, Banks'
Security Chains Rattled, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at 12; Carley & O'Brien, supra note
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New retail electronic payment mechanisms currently exist in three
forms, with at least two additional mechanisms scheduled for future opera-
tion. The three operational systems are: (1) payments services designed
to protect credit card account numbers, such as the three-party escrows
offered by First Virtual, 49 and "secure" credit card payments services of-
fered by Wells Fargo Bank;50 (2) "super-smart-cards" including pre-paid
cards capable of storing sums for telephone calls or public transportation,
as well as for other small and large-purchase transactions;51 and (3) forms
40, at 1. See also John Markoff, Security Flaw is Discovered in Software Used in Shopping, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at Al (revealing that Netscape security software contained a
serious flaw allowing penetration of credit card numbers used in Internet commerce).
49Wendy Taylor, They're Coming For Your Wallet! Electronic Currency; Rtality Bytes, PC-
COMPUTING, Apr. 1995, at 150, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CurNWS File.
One of the key problems that appeared in early Internet purchase transactions
was the risk of giving a credit card number and related validation information to a
seller of goods or services over the Internet and of having the number misused by
another Internet participant or even by the seller. See Electronic Money; So Much for the
Cadless Society, THE ECON. Nov. 26, 1994, at 21 [hereinafter Cashess Society] (speculating
on possible payment methods for goods over the Internet). Some buyers resist giving
such potent information to an open forum such as the Internet. Other buyers dislike
the prospect of making a separate telephone call to give the seller their credit card
numbers; to the true Internet aficionado, the second communication severely hindered
the speed and attractiveness of the Internet purchase, to say the very least. It also opened
the door to unauthorized use of validation information for the credit card account
by someone penetrating the system.
Some banking experts do not consider these secure credit card transactions as
conceptually similar to "electronic money" because they operate like a regular credit
card transaction in which the consumer card-holder "receives a bill for the purchases
made on a regular credit card statement in the next billing cycle... ." Laster & Wen-
ninger, supra note 1, at 6 n.l.
50See Markoff, supra note 40, at Al (security flaws in software supporting payment
systems such as this). For information on the original software for Netscape that was
designed to ensure security for confidential data such as credit-card account numbers,
see Netscape Products, Netscape Merchant System, available at http://homw.netscape.com/
comprod/merchant.html (online order processing system processes credit card trans-
actions, obtains authorizations, and issues electronic receipts) [hereinafter Netscape].
51Smart-card technology has existed for some time in western Europe and the
United States where various entities have issued smart cards for repetitive, small-dollar
purchases, such as transit fares and telephone calls. See Briggs Adams, Card Qffered for
Fast Talkers and Frequent Fliers, CHIC. LAWYER, Aug., 1995, at 68 (pre-paid phone cards
circulating in Europe and Asia for a decade with total sales more than $4 billion).
Technology experts have predicted that smart cards would replace all small-dollar
currency transactions-such as purchases of daily periodicals, soft drinks, and other
vending machine items-as the cost of issuing and circulating currency rose. Laster
& Wenninger, supra note 1, at 1.
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of "private script," which include stored-value mechanisms such as those
Mondex offers.5 2 These stored-value cards are similar to telephone and tran-
sit value cards in circulation in the United States and Europe.
The two additional payment systems that have been announced, but
are not yet operational, include (1) "electronic cash" systems that use pre-
paid bits of legal tender distributed by the national government or by banks
and other financial service providers, 53 and (2) "electronic checks," which
are electronic substitutes for paper-based orders to pay funds from an ac-
count.5 4 This Article focuses primarily on announced private script and
electronic check mechanisms.
1. Electronic Cash
Electronic or digital cash is a method of storing value electronically
that is "transferable in real time between individuals and firms, or between
Smart cards are similar to "real money" in a number of respects that pertain
to this discussion. First, they store value in a readily useable form. Second and third,
respectively, but less happily, they are susceptible to the risk of loss or theft, and to
the risk of counterfeiting. See Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 2, 5, 13.
Super-smart cards are currently being offered by Mondex, a venture of National
Westminster Bank (U.K.) in projects in Swindon, England, and in conjunction with
Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco, California. Tom Foremski, Digital Cash in Your
Chips-Issues such as money-laundering and evasion of taxes have yet to be dealt with satisfactorily!
Smart cards and electronic money, a UK trial attracted worldwide attention, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CurNWS File (explaining details of Mondex
systems). Rapidly developing technology will allow the same card to store value, con-
tain access codes for a variety of accounts (bank accounts as well as traditional credit
cards), and store biomedical and other data personal to the cardholder.
52e Foremski, supra note 51 (describing the Mondex card as one that stores digital
money).
531nterview with Colin Crook, Senior Technical Officer, Citibank (CNN television
broadcast Aug. 8, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Scripts File, Transcript
No. 1151-5 [hereinafter C rook Interview] (predicting that it would take approximately
ten years to get "real [electronic] money-bits of legal tender into circulation").
54Hansell, supra note 44, at D2; Marjanovic & Kutler, supra note 44. See also, U.C.C.
SS 3 -103(a)(6); 3-104(a), (f) (1995) (defining "order," "negotiable instrument," and
"check").
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firms."5 Electronic cash should offer three key benefits to participants: (1)
finality of the payment transaction or "good funds," 56 (2) some measure
of data privacy for the participants, 57 and (3) anti-counterfeit measures. 58
Some of the systems currently operating, such as Mondex, also offer a fourth
benefit in the form of peer-to-peer processing that eliminates the need for
a financial intermediary to transfer the payment from buyer to seller.59
Electronic cash systems, such as that offered by DigiCash, require pro-
spective purchasers to first establish an account.6 0 The consumer next down-
loads value from a bank account to an "electronic wallet" in her computer
in a process that is similar to retrieving cash from an automated teller ma-
chine ("ATM"). 61 The consumer then may use digital coins to pay for pur-
55Daguio, supra note 9, at 9. See also First Bank of Internet, Announcement: FBOI Opens,
availabe at fboi@netcom.com (detailing operation of Internet "cash" account offered
by First Bank of Internet ("FBOI") and VISA International in conjunction with a
FBOI-procured "VISA ATM Card" (automated teller machine card)). The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency and banking authorities in Illinois in May 1995,
forced abandonment of this program on the ground that FBOI lacked requisite federal
or state approval to accept "deposits." See also Amy Cortese & Kelly Holland, What
is the Color of Cybermoney, Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1995, at 80 (describing the problem of
privacy when electronic payment systems are used).
56Dr. Daniel M. Schutzer, Vice President for Technology at Citibank, N.Y., Com-
ments at the CITI Conference on Electronic Commerce, at Columbia University Grad-
uate School of Business (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Schutzer Comments].
57Dr. David Chaum, Managing Director of DigiCash, Inc., Comments at the CITI
Conference on Electronic Commerce, at Columbia University Graduate School of
Business (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Chaum Comments].
58Schutzer Comments, supra note 56. DigiCash has features designed to ensure
against the possibility of reuse of digital coins and against counterfeiting that entail
marking each "coin" with a unique validating code and guarding that code from inter-
ception by the banks transferring the credit as well as from vendor and buyer. The
DigiCash system also is designed to avoid interception of data and interruption by
computer viruses. Chaum Comments, supra note 57.
591n the DigiCash system the seller may "deposit" the value in a traditional bank
in order to use the value/funds for other extra-Internet purposes, or keep the value
stored until required. Chaum Comments, supra note 57. The Mondex system allows
holders to transfer value from card to card with the assistance of a hand-held computer
developed by Oki ofJapan and may redeposit stored value in the bank. Timothy Jones,
Chief Executive Officer of Mondex International, Comments at the Cyberpayments
Colloquium, U.S. Department of Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
at New York University School of Law (Sept. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Jones Comments].
60Cortese & Holland, supra note 55, at 80.
61The European Commission and a group of European banks are testing "elec-
tronic wallet" technology. Chaum Comments, supra note 57.
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chases from Internet suppliers, who store them in the same form for their
own later use or exchange them for credits in accounts at traditional banks.
Experts suggest that lay buyers' receptivity to digital cash may vary
with the nature of the payment systems with which they are familiar. For
example, experts anticipate that consumers in western Europe who are ac-
customed to smart cards and giro systems 62 will accept digital cash more
readily than U.S. consumers.63 One expert cautions that general acceptance
will be slow because many consumers do not trust personal computers, let
alone digital cash.6 4
For purposes of this article, it is necessary to "classify" or "describe' 65
"digital" cash, and to explain how characteristics of digital cash systems
affect the types of risks inherent in electronic cash systems. These factors
dictate the rules that these payments systems will require.
a. Legal Tender 66
Experts have predicted that commercial markets will have to wait years
for digitalized legal tender .6 The prospect of digitalized legal tender raises
larger questions of the convertibility of stored value to both "money ' 68
62For more information on giros, see JOHN F. DOLAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: TERMS AND TRANSACTIONS IN COMMERCIAL LAW 417-20 (1991).
63Richard Field, Comments at the CITI Conference on Electronic Commerce,
Columbia University Graduate School of Business (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Field
Comments]; John Wenninger, Comments at the CITI Conference on Electronic Com-
merce, Columbia University Graduate School of Business (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter
Wenninger Comments].
64Schutzer Comments, supra note 56.
65Taxonomists "classify" members of the same species and "describe" new species.
Interview with Val K. Nolan, Professor (Emeritus), Indiana University School of Law
(Nov. 3, 1995) (Professor Nolan is a noted ornithologist). For the apt use of the tax-
onomy construct, I am indebted to the Honorable Ronald K. Noble, former Under
Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Professor of Law at New York Univer-
sity School of Law, Remarks at the Cyberpayments Colloquium, U.S. Department
of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, New York University School of
Law, New York (Sept. 27, 1995).
6631 U.S.C. 5 5103 (1994) (defining "legal tender").
67Crook Interview, supra note 53.
68E.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1995) ("[A] medium of exchange authorized or adopted
by a domestic or foreign government ... [including] a monetary unit of account estab-
lished by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more
nations.'').
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and other forms of value. 69 Digitalized legal tender would require issuance
by the national government 70 and distribution through channels designed
to minimize the opportunities for counterfeit tender to be in circulation.7'
Digitalized legal tender, like paper currency and coins, would be suscept-
ible to loss or theft. Guarding against loss or theft would require a system,
such as registries of ownership of particular tender cards, similar to the
current Federal Reserve Board policy of recording serial numbers of bills
provided to the first bank to take possession. 72 Alternatively, the payment
system could record the amount of tender stored in the card and the amount
disbursed in any transaction each time the holder uses the card. Legislatures
could adopt rules providing purchasers of lost or stolen tender cards or ac-
cess devices with the equivalents of (1) "stop payment" authority,73 and
(2) the right to reimbursement for the balance of the card or device's value
at the time of the stop order.7 4 Among the disadvantages of ownership or
use registries is their propensity to disturb the privacy offered by "cash"
transactions.
69Commentators have predicted that:
[m]uch will turn on the value which users of e-cash prove to attach to its convertibility
into other forms of money. And here, one confronts questions that are related not
merely to the Internet alone, nor indeed to electronic money alone, but are new-age
cousins of the questions people asked when the first coins were struck, and when the
first paper money was circulated, and when the first current accounts and credit cards
were offered. The particular excitement of electronic money is that it poses the ques-
tions afresh in a pure, almost conceptual form: electronic money promises no intrinsic
value, and barely even the trace of a physical existence. The Internet is about to push
to the limit the question of what makes money worth what it is deemed to be worth.
Cashless Society, supra note 49, at 21, 22-23.
70Ca as Society, supra note 49, at 23.
71Cf, e.g., $100 Question: Will Ben's New Look Stop Counterfeits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1995, at D19 (announcing redesign of U.S. paper currency to make it less susceptible
to counterfeit).
72Interview with Robert Kaiman, Esq., Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
in Miami, Fla. (Oct. 12, 1995).
7su.C.C. S 4-403 (1995).
740f course, questions of reliability of the reports of loss or theft would arise and
would require rules to distribute losses should the person attempting to use the card
or device have proof of lawful acquisition.
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b. Private Script
Currently operating "electronic cash" systems involve two primary
variations of private script. One expert refers to these variations as "net-
around money" and "walk-around-money."75 Internet commerce par-
ticipants can use "net-around money" for on-line purchases, investments,
and other value transfers but only in transactions with sellers who have
suitable software. "Walk-around money" is more portable because it can
be stored in smart cards or other small moveable access devices.
An example of "net-around money" are digital coins offered by
DigiCash. DigiCash allows its customers to transform bank credits into
digital coin credits.7 6 Holders of digital coins may use them for Internet
purchases, thus making them characteristic of "net-around money."
An example of "walk-around-money" are Mondex cards. 7 7 Holders
of Mondex cards download value from bank accounts like DigiCash
customers.7" As with existing stored-value telephone and transit cards,
Mondex card holders can use them in person where the counter-party has
a card reader, which Mondex calls an "electronic purse." 79 Mondex card
trials in the United Kingdom connect consumers with counter-parties such
as grocers and newspaper stands. Consumers participating in the San Fran-
cisco trial can connect with the headquarters of Wells Fargo Bank and
75William Melton, founder of Verifone, Inc. and CEO of Cybercash, Remarks
at the Cyberpayments Colloquium, U.S. Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work, New York University School of Law, Sept. 27, 1995.
76e Saul Hansell, Today, Shoppers on Internt Get Access to Electronic Cash, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 23, 1995, at D4 (announcing joint venture between DigiCash BV and Mark Twain
Bank of St. Louis, Missouri).
77Mondex is a proprietary card-based retail electronic payment system developed
by a subsidiary of National Westminster Bank in the U.K., and also operated as ajoint venture in the United States with Wells Fargo. See Foremski, supra note 51 (describ-
ing the Mondex smart card trial project).
78Foremski, supra note 51.
79Mondex's electronic purses may be stationary or portable. In the latter case,
Mondex customers may use a hand-held "purse" that looks a great deal like a small
cellular telephone. The purse allows Mondex customers to transfer value to another
Mondex customer without the need of an intermediary, such as a bank or retailer.
Jones Comments, supra note 59.
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neighboring merchants such as Starbuck's Coffee. 0 Because of the wide
availability of card readers in the trials and of Mondex's plans to expand
participation,8 1 Mondex's customers' opportunities to use the value stored
appear to exceed uses for net-around money systems. In addition, although
Mondex cards in many respects function like point-of-sale debit cards,
holders also can transfer value to each other. As a result, Mondex cards
function more like cash.8 2
Commentators express their reservations about private script digital
cash systems. First, critics question the convertibility of digital cash to other
payments systems and users.8 3 To retrieve the value stored from the "elec-
tronic wallet" in which the digital coins sit, the customer must direct the
coin issuer to make a reverse transfer from their wallet to a bank account.
Successful completion of the reverse transfer, of course, will depend on the
coin issuer's willingness and capacity to refund the value it previously re-
ceived from the bank.
Second, commentators note that convertibility depends on the issuer's
solvency at the time of the customer's request and the existence of con-
tracts or legal standards supporting the reverse transfer.8 4 Some commen-
tators recall the era when individual U.S. banks offered bank notes8 5 that
were backed not by government securities, but by the issuer's promise to
honor the notes' value.8 6 Some commentators worry that electronic private
script issuers may experience liquidity crises similar to those that affected
19th Century issuers of U.S. bank notes,87 thus creating more generalized
8
°Foremski, supra note 51.
8Md.
82 d. Of course, cards like Mondex cards have the capacity to do more than store
value. They are "access devices" for these payment systems and also at present have
storage capacity suitable for personal information, including biomedical data, and other
account access devices.
83Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 4-5, 7-8, 13.
84E.g., Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 7-8.
85EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 47 (3d ed. 1991);
Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 4.
86Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 4.
87E.g., Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that consumers would be
at greater risk in a nonbank network because a nonbank issuer of value would not
be subject to the same regulation and supervision as a bank issuer).
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uncertainty about private script that may result in a "drag on commerce."88
Other commentators, although acknowledging the risks of private script,
particularly of inadequate capital, are more optimistic and assume that the
market will find appropriate solutions s9
The third common concern critics express regarding digital cash systems
and other smart-card payment technologies (even those in which banks play
a central role) is that these payment mechanisms do not constitute legal
tender for all transactions.90 In this respect, private script creates the possibil-
ity of competing currencies, both public and private. Some of these cur-
rencies will constitute legal tender for some purposes but not for others;
some will involve only delivery of public benefits; some will be digitalized
legal tender; and some will be strictly private script. Still others will be
counterfeit. Commentators express concern that competing electronic cur-
rencies may devalue each other and hence pose a threat to monetary policy.91
2. Electronic "Checks"
Electronic checks 92 would have many of the properties of paper-based
instruments as well as the convenience, speed, and security of electronic
delivery. Electronic checks, like wholesale wire transfers, arguably offer more
security than paper-based instruments because the account holder can con-
trol access to the account by highly specialized security devices and because
88Eugene Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at the CyperpaymentsColloquium, U.S. Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
New York University School of Law (Sept. 27, 1995).
89Field Comments, supra note 63.
9 Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 4.
9'See Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 14-17 (analyzing monetary policy issues
that might be raised by electronic money).
92For purposes of this Article, I have concentrated on rules appropriate for instru-
ments drawn on banks. As this subset of the industry grows, it is likely that "electronicdrafts" will appear. Rules for electronic drafts should have models similar to thoseI propose but also should accommodate existing differences in the legal status of drafts
and checks.
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digital signatures are harder to forge.9 3 In addition, because the drawer
delivers the payment instruction electronically to the payee, electronic checks
are less likely to be stolen in transit or from the payee.
"Electronic checks" appear to be variants of regular checking or de-
mand deposit account relationships as they exist in the United States Elec-
tronic checks, however, do not fit within the existing regulatory schemes
available in the United States for paper-based checks, such as Articles 3
and 4 of the U.C.C., and Subpart A of Federal Reserve Board Regulation J.
9 4
For example, although electronic checks do not qualify under the U.C.C.
as "written instructions to pay money,''
95 they may be considered "signed" 96
by the "drawer" sufficiently for U.C.C.'s validation purposes. Of course,
with paper-based checks and drafts, both the writing and the signature are
validation devices. Electronic checks apparently will have only one of the
two standard forms of validation.
On the positive side, electronic checks and drafts are similar to paper-
based instruments, because they are account-based.97 In addition, electronic
93DigiCash BV, "Welcome to the DigiCash Webserver," at "about ecash" and
Figure 11, reprinted in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, EXPLORING THE
WORLD OF CYBERPAYMENTS, AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY at Appendix I
(Examples of Cyberpayment Systems as described on the Worldwide Web) (Sept. 27,
1995) [hereinafter "FinCen Report"] (describing techniques making digital signature
in coin form difficult to counterfeit or forge) (copy available from the author). Cf Laster
& Wenninger, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that "it remains an open question whether
it will be easier to protect monetary value in a paper or in an electronic environment").
94Collection of Checks and Other Items By Federal Reserve Banks, 12 C.F.R.
S 210 subpt. A (1995).
95U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(6) (1995) (defining "order," which encompasses both "checks"
drawn on "banks" and "drafts" drawn on drawees other than banks). Writings also
must be signed "by the person giving the instruction." U.C.C. S 3-103(a)(6) (1995).
96U.C.C. S 1-201(39) (1995) (defining "signed"). Thus, if the validation device
(digital signature/algorithmic string) is treated as a "symbol executed or adopted ...
with present intention to authenticate a writing," the device might qualify as a
"signature" for this purpose. U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1995).
97Account-based electronic payments mechanisms, including wholesale wire trans-
fers, offer the collateral benefit of leaving a trail with which to monitor criminally sus-
picious transactions-whether based on activity observable by humans or on artificial
intelligence programs being deployed by major financial institutions for detection of
credit risks and of money laundering or fraud. See 1995 OTA PAPER, supra note 20,
at 54-55 (Table 4-2: "Current Monitoring and Compliance Systems"), 67 (Table 4-3:
"Electronic Fraud Detection at the Travelers Insurance Company").
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payments mechanisms follow current initiatives to reduce the cost of col-
lecting payments, such as electronic presentment 98 and check truncation.99
They also meet the longstanding policy, established in part by the Expedited
Funds Availability Act of 1987, of curtailing certain credit risks by hasten-
ing the speed of collection by limiting opportunities for "float." 1 00
On the negative side, because the communication medium for the pay-
ment increases risks of misdescription of the beneficiary of the payment
or misdirection of the payment, it may be more difficult to establish either
9 Electronic presentment together with check truncation are methods of reduc-ing the costs of check collection. See Phil Brit, Electronic Checks Ready for Takeoff: Elec-
tronic Check Presentment, 4 AM. COMMUNITY BANKER, Aug. 1995, at 19 (explaining thatinstitutions reluctant to start electronic presentment choose imaging and check trun-
cation); Data Exchange, ABA BANKING J., Mar. 1995, at 74 (describing how FederalReserve Bank of Minneapolis to offer image processing and advanced check trunca-tion services). Revised Article 4 expressly provides for electronic presentment. U.C.C.
4-110 (1995).
99Check truncation eliminates:
the physical handling of paper checks at some point of the check collection process.The data necessary to process the check is obtained through MICR [Micro IncodedCharacter Recognition] technology.... Currently, banks seldom use check truncationin consumer transactions; however, credit unions normally truncate their consumer's
share drafts which are check-like equivalents.... The actual paper drafts have beencopied then destroyed.... Active participation by banks in the check truncation process
would reduce the processing costs associated with check collection. Because check trun-
cation expedites the collection process, the time period between the issuance of a check
and the final payment would be shortened, decreasing the "float," and shorteningthe holding period necessary for banks to determine whether a check ultimately will
be honored.
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, ET AL., PAYMENT SYSTEMS 264-65 (5th ed. 1993).
One of the features of the 1990 revision to Article 4 of the U.C.C. was the addi-tion of specific provisions applicable to agreements between collecting banks and payorbanks pertaining to truncation. U.C.C. § 4-209(b) (1990). Another facilitates bank-
customer agreements to truncate processed and paid checks at the payor bank. U.C.C.S 4 -406(a) (1990). Original Article 4 also allowed for the possibility of truncation. U.C.C.
5 4-406(1) (1989).
10012 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994), as implemented by Federal Reserve Board Reg-
ulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (as amended) (1995). See Knudson et al., supra note 1,
at 269-70. The term "float" refers to the time value of deposits between the timethe depositor delivers an instruction or order to pay and the time the payee-beneficiary
actually collects the funds represented by the institution or order to pay. ProfessorsSpeidel, Summers, and White define "float" as "[arising] when the payee takes [a]
check in at least provisional settlement for a debt at a time when the bank on whichit is drawn has not debited the account. Thus, in effect, the depositor doubles her money.The bank treats her as though she has money in the bank and the merchant treatsher as though she has paid." SPEIDEL ET. AL., supra note 99, at 256. The FederalReserve Board has concentrated on reducing float as a means of controlling payment
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ownership of the check or identify the agency to enforce it should owner-
ship or entitlement disputes arise.101 As a result, drawers may face increas-
ed risks of "double payment" of electronic checks, i.e., having two parties
demand payment of the same check.
0 2
A real question exists about the taxonomy of electronic checks. To the
extent that banks continue to serve as the drawees of these "checks," the
law could classify them as traditional checks, differing only in terms of
delivery methodology to the payee and the collection process. If this were
the case, the rules in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. or the 1989 UNCITRAL
Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes could
serve as models for participant protections that would apply, respectively,
directly or by analogy to electronic checks. Alternatively, the law might
describe electronic checks as a new species of payment system more closely
related to other existing electronic payment mechanisms. For example, they
could constitute sub-groups of funds transfers that are governed by funds
system risk since at least 1983. SPEIDEL ETAL., supra note 99, at 253. See, e.g., 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,752 (1985) (Federal Reserve Board proposed several measures to reduce Federal
Reserve float); 48 Fed. Reg. 20,802 (1983) (approving proposals to reduce and price
Federal Reserve Check float).
01Some commentators believe that both tasks will be easier, rather than harder,
because of the greater degree of security that will emerge under cyberpayments systems.
See Chaum Comments, supra note 57; Jones Comments, supra note 59. Articles 3 and
4A provide models for rules on establishment of entitlement to pay and on liability
of the account holder in the event of misdescription of the beneficiary or misdirection
of the payment. E.g., U.C.C. S 3-301 (Person Entitled to Enforce Instrument), 3-309
(Enforcement of Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Instrument), 3-312 (Lost, Destroyed, or
Stolen Cashier's Check, Teller's Check, or Certified Check), 4A-207 (Misdescription
of Beneficiary), 4A-208 (Misdescription of Intermediary Bank or Beneficiary's Bank)
(1995).
102The risk of double payment is great in any case in which paper-based checks
are stolen from or lost by the rightful owner. As a result, the law of negotiable instru-
ments has emphasized possession of the instrument as a key element of proof of entitle-
ment to pay. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20), 3-301 (1995). Of course, instruments are lost and
stolen and, to reduce the risk of double payment, parties to instruments need rules
to help decide who is entitled to payment. U.C.C. Article 3 provides two sets of rules
for proof of ownership for lost or stolen instruments, depending on the precise nature
of the instrument in issue (note, check, cashier's check, teller's check, certified check).
U.C.C. S 3-309, 3-312(a)(1) (1995). It also provides that discharge of the obligation
to pay results only when the instrument is paid to the owner or the owner's agent.
U.C.C. S 3-602 (1995).
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transfer system rules1 03 and Article 4A of the U.C.C. Article 4A applies ex-
clusively to "push" transactions or credit transfers. 104
Finally, the law could classify electronic checks. Electronic checks and
security devices (personal identification numbers or digital signatures) re-
quired to activate them might be classified as "access devices" for pur-
poses of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA'').10s Because the EFTA
defines "electronic fund transfer" to encompass both debit (pull) and credit(push) transfers that affect an account, the EFTA is likely to cover elec-
tronic checks.10 6
1°3These of course include Subpart B of Federal Reserve Board Regulation J for
the Fedwire system. 12 C.F.R. 5 210 (1995).
"04 U.C.C . art. 4A pref. note (1995); U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1) (1995) (defining "pay-
ment order"). In "push" transactions, the originator sends bank credits towards thepayee/beneficiary without receipt by the payee of the payment instruction or other ac-
tion required of the payee thus pushing the payment away from its depositary account.However, checks traditionally are considered as "pull" transactions. In "pull" trans-
actions, the payee receives the instruction needed to obtain payment and initiates col-lection, pulling the payment into its depositary account. Scott, supra note 18, at 1667.
The other type of credit transfer in the U.S. is the "automated clearing house"("AGH") transfer. ACH rules apply to instructions given in batches to pay many payees.
EDWARD L. RUBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM 837-38, 867-69 (2d
ed. 1994). This "batch" characteristic of ACH payments makes ACH an unlikely
model for rules for electronic checks.
10515 U.S.C. 5§ 169 3 -1693r (1994), implemented by 12 C.F.R. S 205.2(a)(1) (1985)(defining "access device" as "a card, code, or other means of access to a customer's
account, or any combination thereof, that may be used by the consumer for the pur-pose of initiating electronic fund transfers"); 12 C.F.R. § 205 .2 (g) (1995) (defining
electronic fund transfer). See Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 9-10 (discussinghow Regulation E would apply to electronic money issued by banks on prepaid credit
cards, like ATM and debit cards, the prepaid card would serve as an account accessdevice when down-loading value from a checking account onto the card).
"'6E.g., Hansell, supra note 44 (describing how a group of banks and technology
companies that will design a system to create "electronic checks" to be used to makepayments over the Internet and other electronic mail systems); Marjanovic & Kutler,
supra note 44 (stating that electronic check transactions will more often than not fall
under Regulation E, the consumer protection rules for electronic funds transfers). In-deed, methodologies such as First Virtual's appear to involve "access devices" andto come under the umbrella of the Act because the alias allows the customer and ven-dor to access the account that the credit card represents. See supra notes 1-19 and ac-
companying text.
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There are several disadvantages of subjecting electronic checks to the
EFTA, including: (1) the Act's liability limits, 10 7 (2) its "error resolution"
protocol,10 8 and (3) its scope as a "consumer" protection scheme 0 9 Because
of the EFTA's limited applicability, drawees and payees would face the pros-
pect of distinguishing between personal electronic checks that would be sub-
ject to the Act, and corporate electronic checks that would not be. Thus,
drawees and payees might have to process the different groups according-
ly. Application of the EFTA would result in markedly different rules govern-
ing otherwise identical payment mechanisms, in addition to higher pro-
cessing costs.
A major problem with electronic checks would arise if the drawer were
in one country and the payee in another. In these cases, if electronic checks
were treated as "checks," the UN Convention would not apply,1 0 and ordin-
ary choice of law protocols would govern. Cross-border payment by checks
under current law would increase both costs and risks of collection.
Finally, electronic checks present different demands than paper-based
instruments including validating the identity of the drawer or issuer of the
payment instruction, identifying the person entitled to enforce such instruc-
tion, and determining rules governing the absence of authority to issue the
instruction1 1 Electronic checks also may complicate detection of alterations.
In the United States, three sets of rules are available as models to resolve
different demands inherent in electronic checks. First, Articles 3 and 4 of the
10715 U.S.C. S 1693g (1994) (ranging from $0 to $500 or more depending on
the circumstances surrounding the loss and the point at which the consumer notifies
the financial institution that issued the access device).
10815 U.S.C. § 1693f (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (1995).
10915 U.S.C. S 1693a(2) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (1995) (defining "account"
to include only those maintained for "personal, family, or household purposes.").
110Felsenfeld, supra note 13, at 66-67 (describing problems when similar wire
transfers are governed by the U.C.C. if wholly domestic transfers and by the Credit
Transfers Model Law if cross-border transfer).
"-See U.C.C. S 3-401(a) (1995) (stating that persons not liable on instrument unless
signed by person or person's agent and signature is binding on represented person
under S 3-402); U.C.C. § 3-403 (1995) (stating an unauthorized signature is ineffective
except in favor of a person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value).
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U.C.C. deal with all three issues through a variety of rules,1 2 including the
warranties arising by transfer or presentment of the payment instrument."'
Second, Article 4A deals with the same type of issues as recast in the con-
text of wholesale wire transfers.' 1 4 Article 4A also contains rules governing
responsibility for erroneous payment orders' 5 and erroneous executions
of otherwise valid payment orders"16 that may assist in designing rules appro-
priate for electronic checks. Finally, the EFTA and Federal Reserve Board
Regulation E provide validation rules and error resolution procedures for
consumer electronic fund transfers." 7
C. Distinctions Between Existing and Emerging Payments Mechanisms
In contrast to existing payments systems, new retail electronic payments
systems lack uniform terminology and a reliable taxonomy"I8 These features
limit the ability to frame legal issues and rules for these payments systems.
Additionally, four attributes distinguish the new retail electronic payments
systems from their predecessors. First, emerging electronic payments systems
are more likely to operate over public networks, such as the Internet, than
"'E.g., U.C.C. S 3 -103(a)(6) (1995) (defining "order" as a written instruction topay money signed by the person giving instruction); U.C.C. S 3-301 (1995) (person
entitled to enforce instrument); U.C.C. § 3 -302(a)(1) (1995) (holder in due course);U.C.C. § 3 -3 08(a) (1995) (proof of signatures and status as holder in due course); U.C.C.§ 3-406 (1995) (negligence contributing to forged signature or alteration of instrument);U.C.C. S 4 -401(a) (1995) (stating that bank may charge against customer's account anitem properly payable from that account even though charge creates an overdraft).
"'E.g., U.C.C. § 3-416 (1995) (transfer warranties); U.C.C. § 4-208 (1995) (same).
'"E.g., U.C.C. §5 4A-201 to 4A-204 (1995) (dealing with Security Procedure;
Authorized and Verified Payment Orders; Unenforceability of Certain Verified Pay-
ment Orders; and Refund of Payment and Duty of Customer to Report With Respect
to Unauthorized Payment Order).
"'U.C.C. S 4A-205 (1995) (Erroneous Payment Orders).
"
6U.C.C. S 4A-303 (1995) (Erroneous Execution of Payment Order).
"715 U.S.C. 5 1693a(1) (1994) (means of access); 15 U.S.C. S 1693a(1 1) (1994)(unauthorized electronic funds transfer); 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (1994) (error resolution).
"'FinCEN, Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, An Introductory Survey (Sept.
27, 1995) (copy on file with author).
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over dedicated private networks. 19 The public nature of the communica-
tions and payment media exposes them to increased risks of unauthorized
transactions and alterations, insider abuses, and even outsider penetration'
20
than are present in the private networks.
121
Second, transactions using new retail electronic payments mechanisms
may not be associated with an existing "account," and therefore, may lack
protections afforded to participants through reserve or margin requirements
that aid public acceptance of payment or trading systems.
22
Third, some participants in these new payments systems will be less
sophisticated than the corporate and banking participants in existing funds
transfer systems, 123 and also may be more protective of their privacy than
'
19Private networks were the communications vehicle for existing wholesale wire
transfer systems and automated clearing house systems, internal banking and securities
communications systems, commodities trading networks, and other electronic finan-
cial service systems until very recently. 1992 OTA PAPER, supra note 2, at 15-16. One
exception was the telex, which travelled over public communications networks, but
for security reasons travelled in highly encrypted form. Scott, supra note 18, at 1674.
120Holland, supra note 3, at 96.
12'Unauthorized transactions do occur in the major funds transfer systems. Carley
& O'Brien, supra note 40, at Al (detailing numerous penetrations of Citicorp's inter-
nal funds transfer computer systems and unauthorized transfers of more than $10
million). See U.C.C. S 4A-203, Official Comment 2 (1995) (listing examples of fraudulent
wire transfers where the customer is not liable to pay the order and the receiving bank
takes the loss); U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (discussing requirement that bank use com-
mercially reasonable security procedures to ensure that customer pays for unauthor-
ized payment order in a wire transfer).
122See KURTzMAN, supra note 7, at 153 (margin requirements differ among com-
peting markets, viz., five to ten percent for commodities deals), 159 (five percent margin
for Treasury bond futures); Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 3-9 (analysis of asset
and liability character of electronic money). Bank regulators and funds transfer systems
have been able to increase the levels of protection against credit risks for existing elec-
tronic payments systems through reserve requirements or other types of collateral. 1992
OTA PAPER, supra note 2, at 33-35. For more (but somewhat dated) information on
payment risk, see E.J. Stevens, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Payment System Risk
Issues, ECON. COMMENTARY, June 15, 1989 (making assessment that predates 1990
changes to CHIPS to reduce payment system risk); DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' PAYMENT
SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 3.
123Se U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (discussing characteristic funds transfers as typically
"multimillion dollar transactions" between "especially sophisticated business or finan-
cial organizations").
[Vol. 15:197
CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS
existing payments systems participants. 124 Indeed, some participants in the
new systems may be interested in these systems precisely because they offer
more anonymity than traditional payments systems. 125 Finally, emerging
retail electronic payments systems are likely to operate with little or no
government regulation to promote safety and soundness 126 or consumer
protection.1
27
III. WHAT ISSUES REQUIRE STANDARDS AT THIS TIME?
As previously noted, acceptance by the general public of new retail elec-
tronic payments systems depends on their speed, reliability, and security.
Speed, of course, is not the primary concern of this Article. 28 Reliability
and security are matters of concern in all retail banking and financial service
transactions and are matters of special concern whenever the payments
system depends on electronic media. Given the pace with which these
payments systems are evolving, we need to adopt baseline legal standards
that provide appropriate protection and are sufficiently flexible to allow
for innovation.
"
4This factor together with desire for anonymity in transactions will complicate
scrutiny of transactions for purposes such as detecting money laundering. Vic Sussman,
Policing Cyberspace, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 23, 1995, at 54.
'Id. Accord, Cortese & Holland, supra note 55, at 36 (once encrypted money leaves
bank account, electronic cash cannot be traced to customer).
"26E.g., Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 8. Other "electronic money" service-
providers will attract the attention of regulators if they stray into regulated activities
such as deposit-taking. For example, in May 1995, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency issued an advisory warning First Bank of the Internet in Des Plaines,
Illinois, that it lacked both a bank charter and federal deposit insurance necessary to
accept "deposits" as it had advertised it would over the Internet. Cortese & Holland,
supra note 55, at 66.
127Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 4 (bank-issued prepaid smart cards not
tender). Some of the smart cards will be covered by the EFTA. Others may not be-
cause they will not operate on the basis of established "accounts" as that term is defined
in Section 903 of EFTA because they are not means of accessing "accounts" at "finan-
cial institutions." Congress may exempt stored-value smart cards from EFTA cover-
age. Where the EFTA does not apply, users will lack basic consumer protections it
affords viz., documentation of transfers, error resolution, and liability for unauthor-
ized transfers.
To the extent that they are not operated by banks, Article 4A of the U.C.C. will
not govern these transactions and neither will the Model Law on International Credit
Transfers.
..See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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Part III of this Article focuses on subjects for which there is the greatest
need to have baseline protection and for which competing regulatory models
for different payments mechanisms-electronic fund transfers,129 wholesale
wire transfers, and checks-offer different answers to particular problems.
Part III of this Article identifies important distinctions between electronic
cash and electronic checks and drafts.1 30
A. Reliability Rules
Counter-parties in electronic transactions need assurance that the trans-
actions in which they participate are reliable. The buyer-sender wants pro-
tection against the dissembling or non-performing seller-beneficiary. The
seller wants assurance that the buyer cannot avoid payment after accept-
ing the benefit of the bargain. The absence of face-to-face dealings in elec-
tronic transactions undoubtedly magnifies the need for these assurances.
129The EFrA does not apply perfectly to all aspects of electronic cash and elec-
tronic check transactions. For example, the Act applies only to consumer transactions.
In addition, the Act's definition of "electronic fund transfer" includes "any transfer of
funds ... initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer
or magnetic tape" but restricts the term to those transfers that "order, instruct, or
authorize afinancial institution to debit or credit an account." 15 U.S.C. S 1693(a)(6)
(1994) (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent that new retail payments systems in-
volve service providers that are not "financial institutions" within the Act's defini-
tion, the Act will not apply. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(8) (1994). DigiCash transfers, ac-
cordingly, will not be covered at the stage when the customer effects payment to the
vendor. Accord, Laster & Wenninger, supra note 1, at 9-10. At the time of this writing,
Congress is considering an exemption from the EFTA for certain stored-value cards
(primarily because it would be too burdensome to require vending machines for
beverages and newspapers to dispense a receipt for each transaction although the EFTA
requires that the consumer receive a receipt). H.R. 2158, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
S. 1270, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
In addition to federal regulations on electronic fund transfers, two states-Michigan
and Wisconsin-have enacted laws to protect the rights of holders of electronic fund
transfer access devices. WIs. STAT. § 943.41 (1994); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.354(13)
(1993) (Callaghan 1993).
1301n conjunction with this portion of the Article, the term "electronic fund trans-
fer" refers to the consumer payment system currently governed by the EFTA; the term
"wholesale wire transfer" refers to those credit transfers governed by Article 4A of
the U.C.C. (where enacted) and by Federal Reserve Board Regulation J if conducted
by Fedwire or by rules of the funds transfer systems such as SWIFT and CHIPS. The
term "checks" refers to paper-based orders to pay such as those governed in the United
States by Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. and by Federal Reserve Board Regulations
J and CC. 12 C.F.R. S 210 (1990); 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1992).
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Reliability rules common to both electronic cash and electronic drafts
include rules for (1) verification of the buyer-sender's identity or authority
to use the access device; (2) erroneous execution (whether wrong beneficiary,
wrong amount, or duplicate executions); (3) system failure; (4) stop pay-
ment or reversibility of payment; (5) date when payment occurs; and (6)
discharge by payment of the underlying obligation.
1. Electronic Cash
Electronic cash transactions have elements of both existing retail and
wholesale wire transfers in terms of the types of reliability problems that
may arise. They are similar to retail electronic fund transfers in that they
require an "access device" 131 and their users will include persons who have
"personal, family, or household purposes" for using the payment
mechanism S.13 2 Whether or not Congress exempts "stored-value" cards
from the EFTA, solutions to the issues associated with these cards must
be derived from sources other than the EFTA, particularly where they arise
across national borders.133
a. Verifiability of the Transaction and Related Topics
Counter-parties in electronic cash transactions have a variety of con-
cerns that fall under the general category of transaction verifiability. These
include security procedures to ensure that the sender is authorized to in-
itiate the transaction, means of identifying and reporting errors, and means
of cancelling or amending the transaction.
(i) Security Procedures and Means of Initiating Transactions
The EFTA and Article 4A address security procedures and means of
controlling initiation of transactions rather differently. The EFTA relies
on the duality of the "access device ' 1 3 4 and a "personal identification
''12 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1) (1995).
13215 U.S.C. § 1693a(2) (1994); 12 C.F.R. S 205.2(b) (1995).
133An ABA working group on international electronic fund transfers, chaired by
Roland Brandel, is studying this issue.
13412 C.F.R. § 205 (1995). Access devices commonly are moveable plastic cards
with electronic stripes that consumers use together with a personal identification number
to gain access to their accounts. See SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 99, at 416.
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number" ("PIN") as the exclusive means by which the account-holder
may enter the system. Transfers in which both the correct access device
and personal identification number are present generally demonstrate
authority from the account-holder to initiate the transfer.1
3 5
Article 4A handles verifiability by various approaches depending on
the means by which the sender "sends" each individual "payment order."'1
36
Generally, the recipient (receiving bank) tests the payment order to prove
that the sender is who it purports to be. Article 4A requires senders and
receiving banks to contract regarding the type of test the parties will use.
1 37
Article 4A uses the term "security procedures" for these tests.13 8 Article
4A requires that the security procedure be "commercially reasonable" in
terms of the requirements and situation of the sender.
1 39
Electronic payments systems and financial electronic data interchange
systems will utilize security procedures such as "digital signatures.' "14 Elec-
tronic cash systems, such as that offered by DigiCash, appear to follow the
security protocol required by Article 4A. DigiCash also encrypts the value
135For a matter in which this convergence of access device and PIN did not demon-
strate authority to conduct the transfer, seeJoanne Johnson, Suspect in ATM &am Pleads
Guilty to Conspiracy Charges: ATM Sam Suspect Enters Guilty Plea, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 25, 1993, at BI (explaining how thieves installed a fake ATM in a
shopping mall and recorded customer code information then using counterfeit cards
and stolen personal identification numbers to withdraw cash from ATM's in New York
City).
136Article 4A allows fund transfer participants to agree on specialized procedures
for authenticating paper-based payment orders, those delivered by telephone, and those
delivered by dedicated computer lines.
137U.C.C. § 4A-202 (1995).
'
38Article 4A defines the term "security procedure" as:
a procedure established by agreement of a customer and a receiving bank for the pur-
pose of (i) verifying that a payment order or communication amending or cancelling
a payment order is that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the transmission
or the content of the payment order or communication. A security procedure may
require the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryp-
tion, callback procedures, or similar security devices. Comparison of a signature on
a payment order or communication with the authorized specimen signature of the
customer is not by itself a security procedure.
U.C.C. S 4A-201 (1995).
3V.C.C. S 4A-202(b)(i) (1995).
140Digital signatures are specially designed and theoretically unique algorithmic
strings.
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stored in the customer's electronic wallet to protect the customer's privacy
and to assure that the vendor receives "good funds."' 41
(ii) Identifying and Reporting Errors
In addition to the heightened problems associated with verifying
customers' instructions and ensuring their authority to give such instruc-
tions, electronic payments systems suffer risks of erroneous execution. 42
In electronic cash transactions, erroneous execution risks apply both to the
transfer in which the customer downloads value to the customer's com-
puter and to the transfer in which the customer transfers this value to the
seller to make a purchase. In both cases, the recipient of the instruction
to move value may have no reason to know that an error exists.
There are three ways, however, that the sender should recognize errors.
First, the sender's "electronic wallet" (where the system stores value) may
not contain the value downloaded. Second, it may contain too much. Finally,
the account from which the sender downloaded value may still contain all
that was present before the attempt to download. For these types of errors,
rules for electronic cash transactions can follow Article 4A, which places
the burden on the sender to detect and report errors.14 3 In addition, Arti-
cle 4A places the burdens on the sender to prove that (1) it followed the
requisite security procedure and (2) the error would not have occurred unless
the intermediary or beneficiary in the payment system had followed the
security procedure.14 4 Depending on the nature of the error,4 5 the sender
141See PHYLLIS K. SOKOL, EDI: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 57-58, 60-61 (1989) (ex-
plaining the coded validation devices in electronic data interchange transactions).
1""Erroneous execution" includes three types of errors: payments made to the
wrong party, payments made in the wrong amount, or payments made in duplicate.
13U.C.C. § 4A-204 (1995) (Refund of Payment and Duty of Customer to Report
with Respect to Unauthorized Payment Order) (creating duty of sender to report un-
authorized payment order); § 4A-304 (1995) (Duty of Sender to Report Erroneously
Executed Payment Order) (creating duty to report erroneously executed payment
orders). Under these provisions, the sender has a duty to report within a reasonable
time "not exceeding 90 days after the notification [revealing the error] from the bank
... by the sender." The sender's time for reporting effectively is shortened by Federal
Reserve Board Regulation J to "30 calendar days" after the sender receives notice
that the payment order was accepted or executed or that the sender's account was
debited for the transfer. 12 C.F.R. § 210.28 (1992) (Agreement of Sender).
44U.C.C. § 4A-205(a)(1) (1995).
45The three forms of error are execution to the wrong beneficiary, duplicate ex-
ecution, and execution in an amount greater than intended by the sender. U.C.C.
§§ 4A-207, 4A-303(a) (1995). Article 4A has additional rules governing misdescription
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of value either has no obligation to pay or has an obligation limited to the
amount the sender intended to pay. Senders of erroneously executed pay-
ment orders are entitled to "recovery from the [recipient] ... to the ex-
tent allowed by the law governing mistake and restitution.
' 146
(iii) Cancellation or Amendment of Transfers
Cancellation or amendment of electronic payment transactions creates
additional verification problems. Although it contains requirements for
documentation 147 and error resolution,1 48 the EFTA is silent on these issues.
In contrast, Article 4A has fairly elaborate rules. Article 4A requires verifica-
tion of the cancellation or amendment if the sender and receiving bank
have adopted a security procedure.149 Article 4A also limits cancellation
or amendment to cases in which the sender makes a mistake in the original
payment order with regard to the amount or beneficiary, or to cases of
unauthorized original payment orders.5 0
b. Delays Due to System Failure
System failures affect all electronic payments systems' 51 In the ordinary
EFTA transaction, system failures are merely inconvenient: the customer
of the beneficiary, depending on the severity of the misdescription (non-existent or
unidentifiable person or account, transfers in which the identifying name and account
numbers do not correspond, person identified by name and account number with pay-
ment made to account number specified). U.C.C. § 4A-207 (1995).
146U.C.C. § 4A-205(a)(2)-(a)(3) (1995). Reference to the law governing mistake
and restitution in Article 4A of course refers to common law rules for mistake and
restitution. Rules for emerging retail electronic payments systems would require at the
very least reconciliation of two groups of rules under the U.C.C.-respectively for Funds
Transfers (discussed above) and for Negotiable Instruments (set forth in U.C.C. § 3-418
(1990)), as well as disparate state treatment of mistake and restitution. Rules govern-
ing mistake and restitution outside of the United States also would provide the basis
for crafting appropriate rules for errors of this type. See also, Felsenfeld, supra note 13,
at 564-65; Gerald Herrmann, Background and Salient Features of the United Nations Conven-
tion on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 517 (1988).
14715 U.S.C. § 1693d (1994).
14815 U.S.C. S 1693f (1994).
14U.C.C. § 4A-21 1(a) (1995).
150U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2) (1995).
15See KURTZMAN, supra note 7, at 179-83 (discussing systems failure in Fedwire,
SWIFT, and CHIPS).
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cannot get cash or complete any other transaction available on the ATM.
In wholesale wire transfers, system failures are more problematic. For exam-
ple, these failures pose risks of (1) potential breaches of the sender's duty
to make timely payments, (2) recipient's loss of interest, and (3) recipient's
inability to receive payments or settlements due.
In electronic cash transactions, system failures may cause both sets of
problems associated with failed EFTA transfers and wholesale wire transfers.
Accordingly, electronic cash transfers will require more specialized rules,
such as those Article 4A provides,1 52 to deal with their specialized failure
problems. These problems include failures affecting the downloading of
payment transfers, such as telephonic interruptions and failure of the elec-
tronic wallets to record the attempted transfer or to record it accurately.
c. Stop Payment or Reversibility of Payment
In addition to cancelling or contesting transfers, in certain cases,
customers will expect that they can stop the downloading transfer to their
electronic wallets or reverse the payment if the vendor does not perform.
Rights and procedures under existing payments systems vary widely.15 3 Dif-
ferences in treatment of reversibility of payments in competing payments
systems were at the core of the debate over the proposed New Uniform
Payments Code in the late 1970's and early 1980's.154 Because of the im-
portance of finality of payment to Internet vendors, similarly significant
disagreements over the scope of and procedures for stop orders and rever-
sibility of payments in electronic cash transactions may arise.
152U.C.C. § 4A-305 (1995).
153Examples of these discrepancies include (1) the right to stop payment of checks
by the payor bank under U.C.C. § 4-403 as long as the payor bank has a "reasonable
opportunity" to act on the stop order before it pays or loses the right to act on the
check as U.C.C. § 4-303 provides; (2) the limited right to reverse the payment under
U.C.C. § 3-418; (3) the right to stop "pre-authorized transfers" under the EFTA so
long as the consumer notifies the financial institution orally or in writing "at any time
up to three business days preceding" the schedule date of the transfer under § 907(a)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1693e(a); and (4) no right to "stop" under the federal Fair
Credit Billing Act of 1974 ("FCBA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1666.
154New Uniform Payments Code Report, supra note 15, at 124-26.
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d. Discharge of the Underlying Obligation; Determining when Payment Occurs
Payments systems must provide participants with certain general
assurances. The obligor does not want to be required to pay twice for the
same obligation. The obligee wants to ensure that the obligor will not be
able to change its mind about the transaction and retrieve its funds after
it has received the benefit of the exchange. Accordingly, both consumers
and vendors, as well as any financial service provider representing either
party in the transaction, need rules governing both discharge of the underly-
ing obligation and the point at which payment occurs.
With regard to the discharge of the underlying obligation, neither of
the two statutory consumer electronic payments systems laws, the EFTA
or the FOBA, provide helpful models. Both Acts depend on the parties'
underlying agreements to charge the consumer's account or to require the
customer to pay charges that accrue on the account.155
In contrast, Section 4A-406 of Article 4A contains both sets of rules
for wholesale wire transfers. First, subsection (a) establishes when payment
is deemed to occur. This is the time at which the beneficiary's bank
"accepts ' 15 6 a payment order if the amount is equal to that which the
beneficiary's bank accepted and not more than the amount of the
originator's order.157 Next, subsection (b) embodies the rule that has long
characterized discharge: obligations are discharged by payment "to the same
extent discharge would result from payment to the beneficiary of the same
amount in money."1 5 8 This subsection, however, does not discharge obliga-
tions in cases in which the obligor makes payment by a contractually pro-
hibited means and the beneficiary suffers a loss that could have been avoided
if the obligor had made the payment in accordance with the underlying
contract, provided that the beneficiary notifies the obligor of refusal of pay-
ment and does not withdraw the funds or apply the funds to a debt.
15515 U.S.C. S 1693c (1994) (EFTA); 15 U.S.C. S 1637(a) (1994) (FCBA).
15 6U.C.C. S 4A-209(b) (1995) (defining when acceptance by beneficiary's bank
occurs).
157See U.C.C. S 4A-406(c) (1995) for the rule governing payment orders equal to
the amount of the originator's order less fees charged by intermediate banks in the
transfer.
'
58Cf U.C.C. S 3-310(b), (c) (1995) (covering negotiable instruments and giving
discharge rules for uncertified checks, notes, and any other instruments aside from
certified checks, uncertified checks, and notes).
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Discharge rules for electronic cash transfers may need to distinguish
between receipt of digitalized legal tender and receipt of private script. For
example, receipt of private script might violate an express agreement be-
tween the buyer and the vendor.15 9 In these cases, following Article 4A's
approach, no discharge would occur if the vendor-beneficiary suffered a
loss avoidable by a proper "tender" of payment.1 60 In addition, if the pay-
ment does not result in discharge under Article 4A, the originator-obligor
is "subrogated to the rights of the beneficiary to receive payment from the
beneficiary's bank."1 6 1 The amount of the payment received also could differ
from the amount due under the contract because of the obligor's fraud,
1 62
or by diversion through error or fraud in the payment system.
Receipt of private script in systems such as DigiC ash currently requires
redeposit by the vendor into a bank before the value can be used for other
purposes. Thus, receipt of electronic coins by the vendor is functionally
different from receipt of a credit under Article 4A funds transfers in which
the recipient of an Article 4A transfer has confidence that it will have "good
159This breach would be analogous to shipping goods "C.O.D." in transactions
where the buyer has pre-paid the cost of the goods or the cost of shipment (U.C.C.
S 2-320(1) (1995) (defining C.I.E as including "the cost of the goods and the insurance
and freight to the named destination")). Or it could be analogous to shipment under
reservation (U.C.C. S 2-505(2) (1995) (considering a shipment under reservation one
where the seller retains a security interest in the goods)).
160U.C.C. S 4A-406(b) (1993). Section 4A-406(b)'s "no discharge" is subject to
four conditions:
(i) [the payment was made] by a means prohibited by the contract of the beneficiary
with respect to the obligation, (ii) the beneficiary, within a reasonable time after receiving
notice of receipt of the order by the beneficiary's bank [advice of credit], notified the
originator of the beneficiary's refusal of the payment, (iii) funds with respect to the
order were not withdrawn by the beneficiary or applied to a debt of the beneficiary,
and (iv) the beneficiary would suffer a loss that could reasonably have been avoided
if payment had been made by a means complying with the contract.
i U.C.C. § 4A-406(b) (1995).
162Fraud by the obligor would be similar to fraudulent attempts at accord and
satisfaction at common law. See Berger v. Lane, 213 P. 45 (1923) (discussing require-
ments and application of accord and satisfaction at common law). Revised Article 3
of the U.C.C. permits accord and satisfaction by use of a negotiable instrument only
if the obligor tendered the instrument "in good faith" and as "full satisfaction" of
the claim. U.C.C. § 3-311 (1995) (Accord and Satisfaction by Use of Instrument). The
claimant must sustain other burdens of proof to obtain discharge. U.C.C. § 3-311 (1995).
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funds" either immediately or at the close of the business day.16 Thus, the
payee is more willing to tolerate an immediate discharge of the underlying
obligation in an Article 4A transfer than in electronic cash transfers in which
the vendor must convert the electronic value in order to use it outside of
the electronic transfer system.
Discharge rules for electronic cash transfers also may require system
rules for fee deductions by clearing or intermediary parties comparable
to those in U.C.C. Section 4A-406(c). 64 Alternatively, the system rules may
have to follow Article 4A's requirements that variations of its discharge rules
may be made only by private agreements between transfer counter-parties. 65
Although fees currently are rare, intermediaries in the new payments
systems may begin to charge fees. To the extent that fees are not part of
the original agreement between obligor and obligee, rules for new payments
systems should be careful not to disturb the fee arrangements of the par-
ties to the commercial transaction. The new rules might satisfy this goal
by following the Article 4A standard of refusing to enforce system rules
that vary the agreement of the individual parties to the transfer.1 66
2. Electronic Checks 67
In terms of the types of reliability problems that may arise, electronic
check transactions have elements of both existing paper-based checks and
of retail and wholesale wire transfers. They will be similar to paper-based
checks as "pull" transactions 168 and so require the payee to engage its bank
163For example, in Fedwire transactions the beneficiary receives Federal Reserve
credits when the bank accepts the payment order. 12 C.F.R. § 210.31(b) (1995). InCHIPS transactions, the beneficiary bank receives a right to payment through CHIPS
secured by collateral and due for settlement at the close of the business day. Knudson
et al., supra note 1, at 270.
164U.C.C. § 4A-406(c) (1995).
'
65See U.C.C. § 4A-406(d) (1995) ("Rights of the originator or of the beneficiary
of a funds transfer under this section may be varied only by agreement of the originator
and the beneficiary.").
'
6 6U.C.C. § 4A-406(d) (1995).
'
6 7Certainly some of the transfers will be "checks" drawn on or by banks and
others will be "drafts" drawn on or by non-banks, such as insurance companies, buyers
of goods, or issuers of traveller's checks. U.C.C. S 3-104(f)-(i) (1995).
'6e supra text accompanying note 106.
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in payment collection. They also will require "access devices" similar to
those used in consumer electronic fund transfers or "security procedures"
similar to those used in wholesale wire transfers. 169 Electronic checks raise
numerous reliability issues, including transaction verifiability, delays due
to system failure, stop payment and reversibility of payments, discharge
of underlying obligations, and determining when final payment occurs.
a. Verifiability of the Transaction
To the extent that banks serve as the drawees of "electronic checks,"
the rules for verification of transactions may derive from those governing
paper-based checks. As discussed above,170 digital signatures or other valida-
tion devices"' may substitute for the traditional requirement that the drawer
sign the draw order. The combination of the validation device and record
of the instruction should satisfy most of the likely payees in electronic check
transactions. 7 '
b. Delays Due to System Failure
Delays due to system failure are just as likely with electronic checks
as they are with electronic cash, although the particulars of the failure may
differ. Delays in receipt of the payment by the vendor may involve breaches
of the underlying contracts to pay, whether based on a drawer's obligation
to pay a draft under negotiable instrument law'17 or on the sales contract.
1 74
169See supra text accompanying notes 128-32.
170Se supra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
,
71See generally PHYLLIS SOKOL, FROM EDI To ELEcTRONIC COMMERCE: A Busi-
NESS INITrATIVE (1995) (surveying use of electronic data interchange in different areas,
including finance and electronic commerce).
172To ensure greater acceptance, rules for electronic checks could require express
agreement of the vendor to be paid in this medium and allow for no discharge of the
underlying obligation in cases in which the payment violated this agreement. See U.C.C.
4A-406(b) (1995) (allowing discharge when four conditions are met).
171%e U.C.C. S 3-104(a) (1995) (defining negotiable instruments as containing "an
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money"); U.C.C. S 3-414
(1995) (noting the obligations of a drawer on a draft).
174U.C.C. 5 2-703 (1995) (noting seller's remedies in general expressly include as
breach buyer's failure to make a payment when due).
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Check collection in the United States depends largely on timely action
by various parties. The process begins with the payee of the check,175 moves
to the depository bank and other collecting banks' 76 shifts to the payor
bank,'1 7 and, in some cases, shifts back to the drawer.1 78 Article 4 of the
U.C.C. provides rules for timely action that relate to the necessity of mak-
ing prompt presentment and of learning promptly if the payor has
dishonored the check. Article 4 provides a defense to liability for delays
"caused by interruption of communication or computer facilities, ... [and]
failure of equipment" only if "beyond the control of the bank" and if the
bank "exercises such diligence as the circumstances require" after the inter-
ruption or failure ceases.179 Furthermore, federal rules pertaining to check
collectioni8O also provide incentives for swift movement to and prompt return
from the payor, or notice to the depository bank, in the event of dishonor.18 1
The tradition of imposing liability for these sorts of delays, at least in
the United States, suggests that the rules for electronic checks should pro-
vide incentives for timely action and impose penalties for late action 8 2 These
rules should be similar to those in Article 4 so that they do not distort com-
petitive balances between paper-based and electronic systems.
c. Stop Payment or Reversibility of Payments
Existing payments systems in the United States have radically different
approaches to stop payment and reversibility of payments. For paper-based
instruments, for example, the U.C.C. provides specialized rules govern-
ing stop payment orders of "items ' ' 183 or account closings, including
damages for failure to obey the customer's order on whose account the
17E.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-302(a)(2), 3-304, 3-414(f) (1995).
'
76U.C.C. § 4 -202(a), (b) (1995).
'17 U.C.C. §§ 4-301, 4-302, 4-303 (1995).
178E.g., U.C.C. § 4-406 (1995) (Customer's Duty to Discover and Report Unauthor-
ized Signature or Alteration).
179U.C.C. 5 4-109(b) (1995).
18012 C.F.R. §S 210, 229 (1995).
1811d.
182E.g., U.C.C. § 4-302 (1995) (Payor Bank's Responsibility for Late Return of
Item).
M85U.C.C. S 4-104(a)(9) (1995). The definition of "item" covers "an instrument
or a promise or order to pay money handled by a bank for collection or payment"
but specifically excludes "a credit or debit card slip." Id.
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item is drawn.184 In addition, although finality of payment is a primary
goal of the U.C.C.,185 the U.C.C. has long provided for undoing final pay-
ment in the event of mistake on the part of the payor.186 The U.C.C. limits
the payor's opportunity to recover a payment made by mistake to those
cases in which, among other things, the party receiving the payment did
not act in good faith.18
7
For paper-based or electronic credit card transactions, the account
holder's rights are more restricted. In the event of loss or theft, the account
holder may report the incident to the card issuer and incur a maximum
$50 fee for unauthorized charges to the card,188 and also may close the ac-
count and obtain a new card. The customer, however, cannot make stop
payment orders of the type Article 4 allows in which the account holder
actually authorized the transaction but later determined that the payee has
not performed. Instead, the account holder's primary recourse is through
the less certain route of "error resolution" under the FCBA.18 9 In addi-
tion, if a dispute concerning property or services purchased arises, the
customer may withhold payment for the amount in dispute from the card
issuer.190 The FCBA restricts the nature of the investigation that the issuer
must conduct. Consumer advocates have criticized the FCBA for affording
inadequate protection for account holders who deal unintentionally with
unscrupulous merchants.1 91
184U.C.C. § 4-403 (1995) (Customer's Right to Stop Payment; Burden of Proof
of Loss).
185U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (1995).
186U.C.C. § 3-418 (1995) (Payment or Acceptance by Mistake). Under this provi-
sion, "mistake" includes common law instances of mistake for which restitution is
available as well as specialized mistake cases involving the drawee's mistaken belief
that its customer had not stopped payment or its mistaken belief that the signature
of the drawer was authorized. U.C.C. S 3-418(a)-(b).
'18U.C.C. § 3-418(c) (1995).
18815 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (1995).
189The Act's rules for error resolution require strict adherence to time schedules
and requirement for notice to the card issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1994), as implemented
by 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (1995).
19015 U.S.C. S 1666i (1994) (rights of credit card customers), as implemented by 12
C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1995) (right of card holder to assert claims or defenses against
card issuer).
1918&e Comment, You May Have Already Won....: Telemarketing Fraud and the Need for
a Federal Legislative Solution, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 553, 570 (1994) (describing how telemar-
keters prefer payment by credit cards because of the long delay between the time they
get paid and the customer gets the credit card bill so that customers usually do not
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For debit card and other transfers governed by the EFTA, the customer's
right to stop payment is limited to two situations. The first is "pre-authorized
transfers" where the customer has given prior written authorization92 and
expects to make at least one transfer every 60 days.193 The second involves
cases in which the customer follows procedures set forth in the EFTA . 9 4
In addition, the customer has the right to error resolution under the EFTA.
"Errors" for purposes of electronic fund transfers include: (1) unauthorized
electronic fund transfers; (2) incorrect electronic fund transfers to or from
the account; (3) omission from a periodic statement of an electronic fund
transfer to or from the consumer's account that should have been included;
and (4) computational or bookkeeping errors made by a financial institu-
tion.1 95 Error resolution requires that the customer adhere to procedures
similar to those required for resolution of credit card errors. 96 The EFTA
limits consumer loss caused by unauthorized use to a minimum of zero
-dollars and a maximum of the total of the unauthorized transfers in the
event that the account holder failed to notify the financial institution of
the loss or theft and unauthorized transfers continued.19 7
Different standards for reversibility of payments created an uneven play-
ing field among competing payments systems. 9 8 The Reporters of the pro-
posed new Uniform Payments Code recommended repealing Articles 3 and
4 of the U.C.C. and federal laws governing payments systems "in order
to establish a legal framework for all payments other than cash." 199 They
also recommended adopting rules for stop payment orders and reversing
discover the fraud for several weeks leaving customers with remedies under the FCBA,15 U.S.C. S 1601-1693r (1994)). See generally Federal Trade Commission, RevisedNotice of Proposed Rulemaking: Telemarketing Sales Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,406 (1995)(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (1995)) (proposing, among other things, to make credit
card laundering a violation of the telemarketing sales rule).
1912 C.F.R. 5 205.10(b) (1995).
19312 C.F.R. 5 205 .10(a) (1995).
194These procedures are more fully set forth in Federal Reserve Board Regulation
E, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1995).
19512 C.F.R. 5 205.1 1(a) (1995).
19612 C.F.R. § 205.11(d) (1995).
19115 U.S. C. S 1 69 3g (1994).
19615 U.S.C. S 1693g (1994).
199See Introduction to New Uniform Payments Code Report, supra note 15, at 1(explaining that "[tihe guiding philosophy ... was that the new legal framework should
not distort user choices among payment systems, e.g. as between checks and debit
cards.").
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final payments, including one that was designed for consumer transactions.
Under the Committee's proposed Section 425, consumer drawers200 would
have had only three business days "from the time of the transaction either
to stop or to reverse payments." 20 1 No party, however, could waive the right
to stop payment on an unauthorized order,20 2 if the drawer indemnified
the financial institution against potential liability.
20 3
To foster competition among new retail electronic payments systems,
each system must adopt rules governing stop payments and reversibility
of payment. Depending on customer tolerance (particularly in the United
States), these rules may provide for waivers of these rights, so long as waivers
are express between customer and system, and imposed on all parties to
all transactions.
d. Discharge of the Underlying Obligation; Determining When Payment
Occurs
Traditional check payment rules adopted the doctrines of merger and
suspension to enforce the contract that the instrument embodied, particularly
the requirements that the instrument "be payable on demand or at a defmite
time," and that the drawer of a check must pay if the drawee bank does
not pay.20" Discharge of a check depended on payment to a person entitled
to receive payment, or to someone acting on such person's behalf.205
2 0 New Uniform Payments Code Proposed § 425 (1982). Drawers other than con-
sumers would waive the right to reverse payment on the order but would retain the
right to stop payment under Subsection 425(9) "until the time the order is paid."
New Uniform Payments Code Report, supra note 15, at 24-25. See also New Uniform
Payments Code Proposed § 425 cmt. 2 (explaining that the proposed code "attempts
to preserve and strengthen the value of stop payment orders for consumers" while
also preserving the right of commercial parties to bargain differently); New Uniform
Payments Code Proposed § 425 cmt. 3 (explaining the committee's objections to
granting reversibility in electronic fund transfer transactions).
201New Uniform Payments Code Proposed § 425 (1982). Subsections (1) and (13)
provided exceptions for cash withdrawals and orders that expressly waive the right
to stop payment or reversal.
2 02New Uniform Payments Code Proposed § 425(9) (1982); New Uniform
Payments Code Proposed § 425 cmt. 1 (1982).
203New Uniform Payments Code Proposed § 425(10) (1982).
2
'UC.C. § 3-414(b) (1995).
2 05U.C.C. § 3-602 (1995).
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Discharge of the check's underlying obligation depends on a variety
of factors, including the nature of the check. For example, discharge of the
obligation occurs when the obligee takes a certified check, cashier's check,
or teller's check in payment of the obligation. In these cases, the discharge
is equivalent to receipt of the amount of currency equal to the amount of
the instrument.2 06 When the obligee takes an uncertified check, discharge
occurs when the obligor's bank pays or certifies the check.2 0 7
"Final payment" of paper-based checks may occur in several ways.
These include: (1) payment in cash; (2) settlement of the check without
a right to revoke the settlement under statute, clearing house rule, or agree-
ment; and (3) failure to revoke a "provisional settlement" in the manner
and time provided by statute, clearing house rule, or agreement.2 08
Because electronic checks may encompass all types of paper-based
checks, electronic check systems will need protocols for discharge and final
payment. The payment system may adopt corollary rules for presentment,
dishonor, and notice of dishonor similar to those of U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4.2 09
B. Security Rules
Despite considerable attention from Internet standards groups and soft-
ware manufacturers, 210 security for new retail electronic payments systems
remains a concern. If these payments systems had reliable security in place
to guard against interception of sensitive information, such as credit card
validating information, system rules for security could be limited. During
this introductory phase, however, commercial needs may require more pro-
tection than currently exists. As each system perfects its security measures
206U.C.C. 5 3-310(a) (1995).
207U.C.C. S 3-310(b)(1) (1995).
2°8U.C.C. § 4-215 (1995).
209The payment system may adopt these rules such as those in U.C.C. Articles
3 and 4 as clearing house rules or system agreements. Alternatively, the payment system
could adopt rules based on U.C.C. Article 4A's rules for finality, U.C.C. § 4A-406 (1995).
210E.g., Netscape, supra note 50; RSA Data Security, Inc., Major Networking and
Messaging Vendors Endorse Open Specification for Secure E-Mail, available at
http://www.rsa.com/pub/S-Mine/announcement.txt (July 24, 1995) (describing new
security protocol for text-based messages and other commercial applications).
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(assuming its feasibility), 211 it may be possible either to relax security rules
or to tolerate wider variations of the rules adopted by individual participants
in the payments systems.
2 12
Security issues for purposes of this Article encompass risks from third
parties, as opposed to risks that one of the counter-parties will not perform
as agreed. Third party risks include new subcategories of conversion: (1)
unauthorized orders to download or to pay; (2) alterations either of the
amount contained in the instruction/payment or of the person entitled to
payment; and (3) theft or waylaying of the payment instruction or receipt
of payment. Security rules should require procedures for obtaining records
and for closing accounts. These functions provide particularly important
protections when evidence of either account penetration or unauthorized
use of an aspect of the account, such as account number, personal iden-
tification number, or digital signature, exists.
Protections against enforcement of unauthorized transactions will be
a significant factor in gaining customer acceptance of new retail electronic
payments systems. The need for security procedures and legal standards
may be greater for Internet-based payments mechanisms than for non-
Internet stored-value payments mechanisms.
1. Electronic Cash-Unauthorized Use and Other Concerns
Despite security precautions, electronic cash systems are theoretically
susceptible to the risk of unauthorized use. Security risks exist at all three
points at which the access device is used in electronic cash transfers. At
the first step in an electronic cash transaction, an interloper might divert
value as the account holder attempts to download value from the depositary
account, intercept the account holder's address and identifying informa-
tion, or order additional downloading without the account holder's
authorization. The account holder whose account is debited without
authorization should have a means of protecting against such interceptions
and of recovering the misappropriated funds. During the second step, when
2"See Sandberg, supra note 40, at B8 (suggesting that security flaws may continue);
see also Carley & O'Brien, supra note 40, at Al (explaining penetration of Citicorp's
cash management wholesale wire transfer systems).
212Essentially, these security issues relate closely to pricing considerations.
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the account holder transfers value to a vendor, unscrupulous vendors, or
their embezzling employees, could program their systems to take more than
the amount required for the purchases.213
Despite attempts by systems such as DigiCash to limit "electronic coins"
to a single use and to guard against the possibility of counterfeiting, 214 a com-
mitted interloper may gain access even to the more sophisticated electronic
systems. 215 Accordingly, rules must govern unauthorized use, especially for
payments systems in which transactions will be very difficult to reconstruct.2 16
Models for these rules raise some of the same issues associated with
"reliability rules." 217 For example, rules governing unauthorized use pro-
vide assurance that (1) the person requesting the transaction is either the
customer or the customer's authorized agent, using techniques such as digital
signatures or personal identification codes; (2) the customer's access device
was not lost or stolen; and (3) that the recipient is the intended payee. Arti-
cle 4A uses the "security procedure" as the gateway for wholesale wire
transfers; 218 it requires that the security procedure be established by agree-
ment between the customer and receiving bank21 9 and that it be "a com-
mercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized
payment orders" as a matter of law.22 0 Article 4A also recognizes agreements
213Such an unauthorized transfer is analogous to the vendor who makes more than
one impression of a credit card or whose employees take impressions for later, unau-
thorized uses or to create counterfeit cards.
214see supra text accompanying notes 128-166.
21
see also John Markoff, The New Watchdogs of Digital Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.16, 1995, at D1, D10 [hereinafter Watchdogs]; John Markoff, Discovery of Internet Flawsis Setbackfor On-Line Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at Al, D3 [hereinafter Setback].216For example, DigiCash's "ecash" system restricts information about the cus-
tomer's ecash password to the customer. Accordingly, the bank from which funds aredownloaded may have information that it debited the customer's account and the
amount of the debit and the alleged recipient (DigiCash), and the access device used
to obtain the funds.
217See supra text accompanying notes 130-209.
218U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 (1995) (Security Procedure), 4A-202 (1995) (Authorized and
Verified Payment Orders).
219U.C.C. 5 4A-201 (1995) (rejecting comparison of a signature on a payment order
or communication with the specimen signature of the customer as a sufficient proce-
dure for this purpose).
220UC.C. S 4A-202(b), (c) (1995). Factors with which to determine whether the
security procedure utilized meets the test of "commercial reasonableness," include:[T]he wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customerknown to the bank, induding the size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally
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in which the customer agrees to be bound by payment orders processed
according to the security procedure the customer has selected.
221
To protect against unauthorized use, the EFTA requires both an access
device and personal identification number.222 Credit card transfers rely on
the presentation of the card, comparison of the signature on the card with
that of the customer presenting the card, and, in most cases, express elec-
tronic authorization obtained from the card issuer. Each of these models
that protect against unauthorized use will serve some part of the emerging
electronic payments systems.
2. Electronic Checks-Unauthorized Orders and Fraudulent Alterations
Electronic checks and drafts arguably present fewer security risks than
existing paper-based payments, at least in the United States.223 The theo-
retical risk that an interloper will divert the order to pay and succeed in
obtaining payment appears to be smaller than in the paper-based systems,
largely because the delivery mechanisms may be more secure than hand-
issued by the customer to the bank, alternative security procedures offered to the cus-
tomer, and security procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks simi-
larly situated.
U.C.C. S 4A-202(c) (1995). Given the current concerns about security procedures in
place for certain electronic payments systems, we should be very cautious about adopt-
ing a standard at this time that presumes adequacy of the security procedures based
on "general use" and "similarly situated" parties. These standards, however, reflect
the approaches taken in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. for paper-based payment systems.
221U.C.C. S 4A-202(c) (1995). One problem with customer selection of security
procedures is the relative ignorance in the customer base vis-a-vis the industry of the
range of security flaws in the system. See Watchdogs, supra note 215, at D1O ("[N]ewly
publicized" flaws in Netscape software "were generally known among software engi-
neers who have developed and maintained the Internet since its creation more than
25 years ago"; tradition of "unfettered inquiry and curiosity" about Internet and soft-
ware security "grated against more conservative business cultures that wanted to keep
information about computer security a closely guarded secret").
222Se 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a) (1994) (predicating consumer liability on presence
of access device and additional method of identification).
22 3Individuals and organizations in the United States use many-fold more checks
and drafts than do their counterparts in similarly developed nations. See DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES' PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 106, 150, 226, 249-250 (providing
figures regarding use of paper-based instruments).
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or mail-delivery.224 However, opportunities for customers and banks to detect
a diversion before payment and to identify the culprit appear to be smaller
in an electronic payments system. As a result, electronic checks will re-
quire rules governing unauthorized use, as well as a means to prevent and
distribute the loss.
Three primary U.S. models serve as samples for developing new rules:
Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. for paper-based orders to pay, Article 4A
for wholesale wire transfers, and the EFTA for electronic fund transfers.
In addition, state laws that provide for the registration and verification of
digital signatures, such as Utah's Digital Signature Act,2 25 offer guidance
about appropriate means of protecting against unauthorized transactions.
Because the EFTA places dollar limits on liability for unauthorized use
and rules for paper-based checks do not, rules for electronic checks may
adopt features of regulatory schemes for wholesale wire transfers, paper-
based checks, and electronic fund transfers for guidance. We also have
presumptions-at least in the United States-that the party who was in
the best position to prevent the loss should bear the loss. Accordingly, elec-
tronic check transactions should include rules such as Section 4A-203 that
governs funds transfers that passed muster under the agreed-upon secur-
ity procedure, but that in fact were not authorized customer orders. Arti-
cle 4A sets forth two means of handling these cases that would apply to
the electronic check transaction. First, banks and customers could have ex-
press written agreements under which the electronic check drawee bank
would limit its ability to enforce the check or to retain payment previously
received from the customer.226 Second, the customer could have the oppor-
tunity to prove that the particular electronic check was not transmitted by
a person entrusted or authorized to act and that the check issued in breach
of the security procedure established by the bank and customer for elec-
tronic checks drawn on the account.2 27
224e Major Banking-Computer Consortium to Develop Electronic Check; FSTC promises early
demonstrations using the Internet, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CurNWS file (electronic checkbooks, digital signatures, and delivery by Inter-
net or "other electronic highway" rendering electronic check "virtually impossible
to forge" and verifiable against alteration).
2 25UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to 46-3-504 (1995).
226U.C.C. § 4A-203(a)(1) (1995).
227U.C.C. S 4A-203(a)(2) (1995).
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The rules governing electronic checks also could borrow procedures
from the EFTA and from U.C.C. Articles 4A and 4 regarding time limits
on recovery when the customer did not act with reasonable promptness
in notifying the bank of the suspected unauthorized transaction. 228 Finally,
the New Uniform Payments Code proposal provides other useful models
for verifying the identity of the transmitter of the electronic check or draft.229
In addition to rules for verifying authority to conduct the transactions
and for guarding against unauthorized use, electronic check systems will
require rules for loss distribution in the event of fraudulent alteration. Cur-
rently, Section 3-407 of the U.C.C. provides these rules for paper-based in-
struments. Under this Section, the obligation is discharged if the payee
fraudulently alters the instrument.2 30 However, it also protects certain parties,
primarily those who have relied on payment, from total loss of the benefit
of the payment by permitting enforcement of the original terms of the in-
strument. 23 1 In the case of instruments altered by unauthorized comple-
tions, enforcement would occur on the terms as completed. 232 Article 4A
treats alterations either as erroneous executions if the amount exceeded
that established in any security procedure 233 or as unauthorized payment
orders.23 4 The model for electronic check transactions may require features
of the rules in Articles 3 and 4A.
Reliability and security rules for new retail electronic payments systems
can draw upon models provided by existing retail and wholesale payments
systems, including electronic fund transfers, wholesale wire transfers, (retail)
credit cards, and checks. New retail payments systems-not subject to ex-
isting statutory or clearing house rules, or to contracts with existing
customers-may alter their initial rules as the electronic payments industry
as a whole, or any particular payments system, devises more tamper-proof
22815 U.S.C. S 1666(c) (1994) (60-day-cap); 12 C.F.R. S 205.6(b)(2) (1995) (60
day cap); U.C.C. § 4A-205(b) (1995) (90 day maximum reasonable time); U.C.C.
S 4-406(d), () (1995) ("reasonable time" not exceeding 30 day and one-year limita-
tions on recredits).
229See generally New Uniform Payments Code Proposed §§ 412(5), 508-509, 511
(establishing transmitter verification requirements).
230U.C.C. § 3-407(b) (1995).
23 1U.C.C. S 3-407 (1995).
232U.C.C. S 3-407(c) (1995).
233U.C.C. § 4A-205 (1995).
234U.C.C. § 4A-202 (1995).
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methods of guaranteeing reliability and security to participants. Choice of
legal models will influence how emerging systems will compete with other ex-
isting and emerging systems and the manner in which innovation will occur.
IV. WHY A STANDARD AT THIS TIME?
Traditionally, rules for new payments systems have emerged as problems
that required resolution arose. A prime example of this type of development
is evident in the law governing wholesale wire transfers. From approximately
1918 until the adoption of Article 4A, no comprehensive law governed these
transfers.2 35 Instead, wholesale wire transfers operated under a combina-
tion of rules adopted by funds transfer systems, Federal Reserve Board
regulations relating to Fedwire transactions, and individual contracts. 236
The absence of a comprehensive statutory scheme until the early 1990's
did not unduly hinder wholesale wire transfers for three reasons. First, par-
ticipants in the funds transfer often had long-established relationships with
each other that caused them to work to preserve their relationships. Similarly,
parties to the underlying transactions (sales, check-clearing, foreign ex-
change, federal funds) had relationships as well. As a consequence, this
patchwork legal framework did not present as many opportunities for
disputes as are likely to arise under new retail electronic payment
mechanisms where counter-parties are less likely to know each other.
Second, the club-like environment of wholesale funds transfers allowed
resolution of most disputes on the basis of "gentlemen's agreements." 23
Third, because unresolved disputes involved very large sums of money,
disputants under wholesale funds transfer systems were more likely to have,
or be able to attract, counsel to resolve disputes.
In contrast, retail electronic payments systems may need the benefit
of baseline rules in order to foster and maintain acceptance among potential
235U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (1995).
2 36Scott, supra note 18, at 1668-78. See also Robert G. Ballen & Natalie H. Diana,
The Need for Artice 4A, 45 Bus. L. 1399, 1399 (1990).
237See Scott, supra note 18, at 1678.
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customers. One payments system expert suggested several reasons to adopt
an early comprehensive regulatory scheme:
Why should people care about how some extremely technical payments
system disputes are settled? The reason is that they relate directly to the
way that bank-like services can, and will, be transferred from payor to
payee. They impact on retail pricing for consumers and, equally impor-
tant, on the manner and kinds of money services available to the public.
Furthermore, unless and until the private parties can amicably agree on
basic responsibilities, the electronic payments modes may not be fully
utilized. Because of the risk of costly litigation, adoption of the new
payments technology through joint ventures may be slowed. The expected
consumer benefits of all the scale economies may fail to be realized fully. 2 3
Additional reasons support the conclusion that rules governing elec-
tronic payments systems should be adopted at this time. First, new payments
systems, particularly those radically different in form from existing systems,
do not fit easily into the rules for existing systems. As a result, the rules
that evolve may not provide adequate protection for customers of the new
payments system. 23 9 Adequate customer protection rules would foster wider
acceptance of these technologies in lay circles and spur additional Internet
or smart-card commercial developments. 24 0
Second, adoption of rules (particularly if they apply across national
borders) may avoid or reduce disparities in regulation between both na-
tional and local jurisdictions otherwise likely to exist or arise in the short-
term.241 They also would reduce differences in regulatory pace and style,
as opposed to content, that typically act as a drag on innovation.
238Elinor Harris Solomon, Conflicts: Banks, Consumers, and the Law, in ELECTRONIC
MONEY FLOWS-THE MOLDING OF A NEW FINANCIAL ORDER 157 (Elinor Harris
Solomon, ed. 1991) (emphasis added).
29See Note, Consumer Protection and Payments Systems: Regulatory Policy for the Technological
Era, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1870 (1985) (focusing on proposed New Uniform Payments
Code that emerged, in part, as Article 4A and in revisions to Articles 3 and 4 of the
U.C.C.).
240See Jeff Benjamin, IRE Drafting an 'Eetronic Check" Product of Baltimore Firm's Research
Debuting on Internet, THE DAILY RECORD, Aug. 30, 1995, at 3 (citing John Bowers,
executive vice president of the Maryland Bankers Association, on need for complex
safeguards before general public will put "real money" on the open wire).
24
'See Felsenfeld, supra note 13, at 60 (noting that differences existed in positions
among U.S. and foreign delegations to UNCITRAL drafting group).
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Third, rules governing the new payments systems may occupy terrain
that other regulatory "models," such as law enforcement and monetary
policy otherwise might dominate. Rules for payments systems based solely
on law enforcement or monetary policy models would shape the industry's
future paths very differently.242
Fourth, early rules might avoid "backlash" regulations. Article 4A,
although not adopted as early as the rules advocated in this Article, developed
without suffering the backlash of the federal Truth in Lending Act 243 or
the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 244 Congress promulgated
both Acts as attempts to address the imbalance between consumer interests
and providers that engaged in abusive or misleading conduct. 24 5
Fifth, because of the lack of ties between Internet-payments participants
and the large volume of expected transactions, disputes undoubtedly will
arise. Disputes without legal frameworks cost more to resolve and are more
likely to be resolved haphazardly.246 The paucity of rules increases the risks
faced by parties to these payments transactions. 247
Sixth, because drawers or payors and payees in Internet purchase and
payment transactions will not deal face-to-face, an "unregulated" or inef-
fectively regulated payments system is more likely to invite opportunities
242Rules based on such models also would break with tradition in the regulation
of payments systems in which operational rules precede others (e.g., Article 4A and
the Treasury's 1995 record-keeping and "travel" requirements for (wholesale) funds
transfers and funds transmittals). See U.C.C. art. 4A pref. note (1995); 31 C.F.R. S 103(1995). This is not to suggest that specialized considerations for law enforcement and
monetary policy will not be required as these new retail systems progress.
24315 U.S.C. §5 1601-1667 (1994).
24415 U.S.C. S 1692-1692(o) (1994).
245The federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") certainly was a reaction to prob-
lems evident in the marketplace. For example, Section 102 of TILA provided:
(a) [I]t is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.
(b) The Congress also finds that ... leases [for consumer use] have been offered without
adequate cost disclosures. It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure
of the terms of leases of personal property for personal, family, or household purposes
so as to enable the lessee to compare more readily the various lease terms available
to him, limit balloon payments in consumer leasing, enable comparison of lease terms
with credit terms where appropriate, and to assure meaningful and accurate disclosures
of lease terms in advertisements.
24"Scott, supra note 18, at 1664.
247Scott, supra note 18, at 1664.
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for fraud.14 8 Finally, because these Internet-payments systems will probably
carry a high volume of low-dollar-value transactions or may involve cross-
border participants, the legal system will have diminished capacity to deal
with these errors and disputes without standardized rules.
V. WHY AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD?
Existing and planned electronic financial transactions have major growth
implications for the global economy.24 9 Experts predict a burgeoning market
for Internet-based information services and other commercial offerings. 2 0
But, as one commentator observed, "the Internet is no more controlled
by the United States than is the United Nations."'25 1
To the extent that new retail payments systems remain without ade-
quate legal standards, commentators predict that customers' acceptance
of some forms of electronic financial transactions could be slower than would
be the case with adequate participant protection.2 5 2 In addition, experts
recognize a need to level the playing field among bank and non-bank finan-
cial service providers. This would aid in the development of the technology
necessary to implement these electronic financial transactions. 253
An international standard would avoid costs associated with disparate
local regulation, including dampers on innovation that result from excessive
or inconsistent regulations adopted by different jurisdictions.25 4 In addition,
because electronic financial transactions are or may be regulated by some
2485e Antilla, Has Cberspace Got a Deal For You.', supra note 4, S 3 (Money & Busi-
ness/Financial Desk), at 5 (SEC action on fraud on Internet). Internet features such
as "anonymous re-mailing" will complicate the identification of the miscreant and
the resolution of disputes. See generally Peter Sinton, VISA Wants to Kill Cash; It Hopes
"Smart Cards' Will Become the Payment Method of Choice, S.E CHRON., Oct. 11, 1995, at(B1;
Robert Hurtado, Treasury Pries Fall Again, Dollar's Dedine Is Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1995, at D26 (describing possible agreement between U.S. andJapan to swap Treasury
securities to help Japanese banks manage possible cash crisis).
249KURTZMAN, supra note 7.
250Powell, supra note 46.
25
'Peter Lewis, On the Net: Privacy for Computers? Chnton sets the stage for a debate on data
encryption, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at C5.
252See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
253E.g., 1992 OTA PAPER, supra note 2, at 2.
25 4For a discussion of these costs from the perspective of differing state product
quality laws in the United States, see David A. Rice, Product Qua/iy Laws and the Economics
of Federalism, 65 B.U. L. REV. 1 (Jan. 1985).
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nations and not others, the market may seek the lowest common regulatory
denominator.2 5 5 However, in so doing, the market would risk losing public
acceptance as problems arise. For this reason, banking commentators urge
development of international standards.2
56
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") spurred new opportunities for international financial transac-
tions.257 Subsequent World Trade Organization agreements on cross-border
financial transactions (to which the United States is not a party) and increas-
mng "border-less" financial transactions involving exchange and securities,
258
suggest that only international legal standards suit the tasks ahead.
VI. WHY SELF REGULATION?
The question of who will regulate new retail electronic payments systems
is one of the major issues facing the infant electronic payments systems.
This debate is tied to the question of whether governments or private
organizations should control the Internet. Some commentators argue that
government regulation of the Internet would "act as a drag on commerce,"
25 9
and, hence, advocate private regulation.
260
Unlike the development of standardized rules, there are six reasons sup-
porting a fairly long delay in promulgating new regulations. First, many
2 55 d. at 44-45.
256E.g., J. Duffy, Global Approach Argued to Protect Consumer in Electronic Banking, AM.
BANKER, July 18, 1988, at 2.
25
'General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreements on Trade In Goods 33, International Legal Materials
(The Am. Soc'y for Int'l Law) 28 (1994).
258Peter Truell, A Japanese Bank Is Indicted in US. and Also Barred, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 1995, at Al.
259lnternet Protection Proposed; House Panel Wants to Freeze FCC Budget for FY 1996, CoM-
MUNICATIONS DAILY, June 20, 1995, 1995 WL 6459914.
2600ne risk of private rules is that the rules will exclude new entrants and, so,
may chill innovation. Commentators have explored these issues in connection with
shared electronic fund transfer and credit card networks. E.g., David S. Evans &
Richard Schmalensee, Economic Aspects of Payment Card Systems and Antitrust Policy Toward
Joint Ventures, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 861 (1995); Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel,
The Antitrust Economics of Credit Card Networks: Reply to Evans and Schmaensee Comment, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 903 (1995).
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jurisdictions already supervise the bank and non-bank service providers
that will offer new retail electronic payments services. Second, as described
above, statutory or regulatory legal standards for payments systems tradi-
tionally have lagged behind implementation by some period.26'
Third, there is a trend toward private regulatory schemes for globally
accessible industries. 262 Fourth, effective private groups serving Internet-
based industries are emerging.2 63 Indeed, in light of the "civil libertarian
ethos of the Net,' 2 64 it is possible that Internet participants would have
more respect for private rules than for regulations promulgated by
governments.
Fifth, given the extensive variety of potential payments mechanisms
that fall under the rubric of "retail electronic payments systems," regula-
tions, as opposed to rules, would face obstacles in keeping pace with change.
In addition, because of its associational, payment-system-rule character,
the private-rule approach may facilitate adaptation to changes in the tech-
nology that pertain to individual aspects of the initial standards. Finally,
experts recognize that international cooperation among industry members
may help to "find solutions to shared problems such as standards develop-
ment, systems failure, or security risks." 265
26
'Examples of this pattern in the United States include the EFTA (enacted in
1977, following introduction of bank ATM cards in the late 1960's and early 1970's),
and Article 4A (1990 adoption for system running from at least 1918).
262For example, the World Administrative Radio Conference allocates frequencies
globally. Other examples of self-regulation that appear to work in complex commercial
contexts include the International Small Satellite Organization, and the Intelsat Assem-
bly of Parties, beginning in the mid-1960s, on the international scale. Intlat meeting
could be landmark gathering; priing structures separate systems issues on agenda, BROADCASTING,
July 29, 1985, at 4, available in LEXIS, Market Library, ASAP II File. Other examples
include the National Futures Associations and the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") on the domestic side. Id.
26 3Among these groups are the World Wide Web Consortium based at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, the Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS"),
the Internet Society, and the Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF"). &e Steve Lohr,
Industry S&eks Means to Filter Inernet Content, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at C5. PICS was
formed to provide private-sector alternative to government censorship of Internet for
pornography and development of private blocking software. For information on the
IETF, see IETF Overview, available at ftp://ds.internic.net.ietf/lietf-dscription.txt.
26 4Lohr, supra note 263, at C5 (quoting Rob Glaser, a software executive who will
lead the PICS group).
2651992 OTA PAPER, supra note 2, at 4.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article advocates prompt adoption of international rules that would
govern the operation of emerging retail electronic payments systems, par-
ticularly digital cash and electronic checks. International rules based on
agreements by providers of payments systems (as opposed to regulations
"promulgated by governments) offer greater opportunity to gain acceptance
from potential customers. International rules also offer greater flexibility
to respond to technical innovations in these systems. This rule-based ap-
proach focuses on like products or activities rather than on like institutions and,
accordingly, offers a level playing field for entities offering competitive
products.
A rule-based approach would accept the invitation imbedded in the
U.S. payments systems laws to vary normal relationships by agreements
of parties or by "clearing house" or associational rules.266 It also would
avoid the lengthy processes of creating and amending statutory schemes
for systems that are changing rapidly. Finally, competition would force the
members of these associations to develop user-friendly rules or risk losing
business to other payments systems.
This proposal would not substitute private rules for all aspects of ex-
isting "regulatory" functions. Rather, it would leave in place existing super-
visory authority that focuses on the institutional character of the service
provider for purposes of safety and soundness and monetary policy.267 These
supervisory institutions may be at the national or state or provincial levels.
This proposal recognizes that a new regulatory authority for globally acces-
sible retail electronic payments systems may become necessary in the future.
A collateral benefit of this "leave-them-where-they-are-regulated" at-
titude would inure to institutions, such as banks, with reputations as
trustworthy enterprises. Other brand-name providers of competing prod-
ucts (such as AT&T, Visa International, MasterCard, American Express,
Thomas Cook, and First Data Corp.) could rely on their brand names to
market their products. Still others (such as postal and transit authorities
266See e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4-103, 4A-501 (1995) (providing that agreement-based rules
should restrict variation by customer agreement only where current payments systems
practices or regulatory systems would restrict such variations).
267Accordingly, banks, non-bank financial institutions, and non-bank corporations
would be regulated by their current supervisory authorities for these new purposes.
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in western Europe and the United States) would have the marketing advant-
ages of quasi- or full-governmental status behind their products. Finally,
new service providers whose products lack brand-name recognition, such
as DigiCash and Mondex, could enter into joint ventures with trusted par-
ties, such as banks, other major financial services providers, or other trusted
brand names, to achieve a competitive edge.
Legal standards for emerging retail payments systems can draw upon
standards that have been developed for existing retail and wholesale elec-
tronic payments systems (electronic fund transfers, credit cards, and
wholesale wire transfers), as well as for paper-based payments systems
(negotiable instruments such as checks, and paper-based credit card trans-
actions). Existing laws governing payments systems often impose different
standards on competing payments systems. Emerging payments systems
appear to have features of more than one of the existing systems. Accordingly,
in developing legal standards for emerging systems, we must evaluate the
similarities and differences in the systems and their relationships to existing
systems. In addition, we must consider how the choice of legal standards
for emerging electronic payments systems will affect competition between
systems and prospects for innovation.
Each of the proposals in this Article will turn on the manner and pace
with which these new retail electronic payments systems develop. That
development is inextricably entwined with customer acceptance. Accord-
ingly, emerging payments systems should reject the anarchical tendencies
of the Internet community, acknowledge problems with security that industry
members currently can offer, and adopt baseline protections and adjust them
as quickly as experience allows. If the emerging payments systems do not,
the industry takes the risk of having more onerous, and potentially less func-
tional, standards imposed by local, national, and international authorities.
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